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Crossroads in Hospital Conversions
A Survey of Nonprofit Hospital
Conversion Legislation
Kevin F. Donohue*
INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the century, nonprofit community hospitals
have been the core of the American health care delivery system.' These hospitals, also known as voluntary hospitals, were
originally established by religious societies and supported primarily through philanthropic donations.2 Modem nonprofit
hospitals are the recipients of substantial community investment
in the form of charitable contributions, tax exemptions and volunteer time.3 Nonprofits provide the vast majority of teaching,
research, education and technological development, as well as a
disproportionately greater share of intensive care and neonatal
units, bum centers and children's hospitals. 4 Often, these services are provided despite their lack of profitability. In addition,
nonprofit community hospitals provide the majority of care for
their community's indigent population. The importance of the
nonprofit community hospital to American culture is apparent
* Kevin F. Donohue is employed by the State of California as Corporations
Counsel for the Department of Corporations, Health Plan Enforcement Division and
is responsible for enforcing the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act. He received his Juris Doctor from John Marshall Law School, Chicago, in 1980 and his
Master of Laws (Health Law) from the Institute for Health Law, Loyola University
School of Law, Chicago, in 1999. He dedicates this article to the inspirational professors at the Institute who collectively continue to inspire new generations of attorneys
in the pursuit of improving the quality of health care for all Americans. The opinions
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Commissioner or the policy of the Department of Corporations.
1. See Vincenzo Stampone, Note, Turning Patients into Profit: Nonprofit Hospital
Conversions Spur Legislation, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 627, 631 (1998).
2. See James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble
Spots in the Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizationsto For-profit Status,
23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 701, 704 (1998).
3. See Linda B. Miller, Robert A. Boisture & Thomas M. Barry, State Attorneys
General's Authority to Police the Sale and Conversion of Not-for-Profit Hospitals and
HMO's: The Legal Basis for Oversight and Proposed Guidelines, 1995 Charitable
Trusts and Solicitations Seminar, Sept. 19, 1995, Williamsburg, VA, § 1, at 2.
4. See id. § 1, at 3-4.
5. See id. § 1, at 3-4.
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from the various federal and state statutes providing tax-exempt
status for these charitable organizations. 6 Regulation of charitable entities can be traced to English common law and the Statute of Charitable Uses.7 Today, nonprofit entities are regulated
by both state and federal government.
Until the early 1990s, the conversion of nonprofit hospitals to
for-profit entities was rare.8 Since 1990, conversions have dramatically increased. 9 Between 1990 and 1996, national surveys
estimate that 192 of the more than 5,000 nonprofit hospitals in
the United States converted to for-profit status. 10 In the first six
months of 1995, more than forty nonprofit hospital sales were
announced (either in negotiation or by signed letters of intent)
by Columbia/HCA alone.1" That same year, forty-eight tax-exempt hospitals actually changed their status to tax-payers. 12 In
13
1996, more than sixty nonprofit hospitals converted.
Conversions have been prompted by a combination of aggressive for-profit competition, industry-wide pressures to control
costs and reduced Medicare payments.' 4 Most of these transactions have been carried out between boards and executives of
the selling hospitals and representatives of the for-profit purchasers and were not routinely Subject to public disclosure. 5
Most of the hospital conversions from 1994 through 1996 were
completed by three for-profit corporations: Columbia/HCA

6. See Stampone, supra note 1, at 633.
7. See id. at 632.
8. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 741, 753 (1998).
9. See id. at 754.
10. See Not-For-ProfitHospital Conversion Issues Prompt Increased State Oversight, GAO/HEHS-98-24, Dec. 1997, at 1 (visited Jan. 6, 1998) <http://www.gao.gov/
whatsnew.htm> [hereinafter "GAO Report'].
11. See Miller, supra note 3, § 1, at 1.
12. See Sandy Lutz, 1995: A Record Year For Hospital Deals, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 43.
13. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 5. See also Bruce Japsen, Another Record
Year For Deal Making: Activity Among Medium-Size Companies Fuels Continued
Drive Toward Consolidation,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 37.
14. See Natalie Seto, Kathy Collins & Bess Karger Weiskopf, Protecting Health,
Preserving Assets, COMMUNITY CATALYST, Oct. 1997, at 1. See also Lawrence E.
Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response to Hospitals'
Changes In CharitableStatus, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 225 (1997).
15. See id. at 5. See also GAO Report, supra note 10, at 5, 8.
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Healthcare Corporation, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, and
16
Quorum Health Group.
Common types of conversions include: (1) conversions in
place, 7 (2) asset sales,' 8 (3) mergers and joint ventures, 9 and (4)
drop-down conversions. 20 Most nonprofit hospital conversions
have been structured as asset sales. 2' Recently, however, a
number of conversions have been structured as joint ventures,
which involve the contribution of nonprofit assets to a for-profit
partnership in exchange for cash and ownership in the new venture.22 Many of the joint ventures require only a portion of the
asset value to be paid at the time of conversion-often as little
as fifty percent.23 The balance of the asset value is held as an
interest in the new for-profit venture, placing the charity's assets
at risk for the economic benefit of the for-profit purchaser.24
Despite their form, these transactions contain a common
thread-nonprofit hospitals' assets are sold or transferred to facilitate the operation of for-profit enterprises.
Historically, conversion oversight was most often conducted
by state offices of the attorney general pursuant to general common law authority to protect public assets. The conversion
mania of the early 1990s provoked a widespread movement to
control and limit the sale of nonprofit health care assets.26 Leg16. Between 1994 and 1996, Columbia reported 50 nonprofit hospital acquisitions,
joint ventures and lease arrangements. Tenet reported 10 while Quorum reported 12.
See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 7-8.
17. For the purposes of this article, conversion refers to the transformation of a
nonprofit hospital assets to for-profit enterprises through the sale or transfer of ownership or control of charitable assets. For a concise description of these forms of
conversion refer to Singer, supra note 14, at 232-34 and Fishman, supra note 2, at 714.
For the purposes of our discussion, a conversion in place takes place when a nonprofit
corporation amends its articles of incorporation to add for-profit powers and to delete
nonprofit restrictions.
18. Asset sales occur when a nonprofit sells its charitable assets to a for-profit
entity.
19. Mergers and joint ventures occur when the nonprofit, contributing charitable
assets, either merges or enters into partnership with a for-profit entity.
20. Drop-down conversions occur when a nonprofit transfers some of its charitable assets to a for-profit subsidiary.
21. Asset sales result in the actual sale or transfer of the nonprofit hospital's assets, name and accounts to a for-profit purchaser for cash, stock, notes or other property. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 7-8.
22. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 7. There are additional methods of conversion, including lease arrangements and corporate restructuring.
23. See Miller, supra note 3, at § 1, at 1.
24. See id.
25. See Singer, supra note 14, at 223.
26. See id.
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islative action was spurred by the secrecy that surrounded conversion activity, the perception that the assets were routinely
undervalued and the
suggestion that these transactions often in27
volved self-dealing.
More than two-thirds of the states have introduced legislation
that would grant state attorneys general wide latitude in reviewing and approving proposed conversions of nonprofit health-related entities to for-profit operating systems.2 s However, some
of this legislative initiative has been based more on political
than practical agendas. The conversion "problem" has been at
times more anecdotal than factual.29 Fear of a change in the
method of delivering health care has overshadowed current economic realities that render marginal nonprofit hospitals inviable.
While the volume of conversions has diminished in the wake of
multiple federal and state investigations launched against Columbia/HCA,3 ° federal and state vigilance remains necessary to
preserve nonprofit hospital assets and to safeguard the multimillion dollar foundations that emerge as a result of conversion
activity. Notwithstanding the need for oversight, excessive regulation should not be implemented to thwart necessary market
consolidations and continued health care reform.3 '
The critical issue is not the form of the American health care
delivery system, but the quality and quantity of the health care
delivered. Viewed in this light, nonprofits have had a legitimate
and beneficial role in ensuring access to good, affordable health
care. In recent years, managed care has exerted tremendous
cost-cutting pressure on hospitals. 32 Small independent hospitals are often at a disadvantage when negotiating managed care
contracts. 33 This factor alone may render independent community hospitals obsolete.34 Simultaneously, low interest rates and
restrictions on the use of tax-exempt bond issues limit the ability
27. See Phillip P. Bisesi, Comment, Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Entities
to For-ProfitStatus, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 805, 820 (1997).
28. Since 1997, 90 bills covering conversions of hospitals, health plans and health
maintenance organizations have been introduced in 34 states. See D. Ward Pimley,
Hospital Conversions: States Slow Pace Adopting Conversion Laws, But AGs Diligently Guard Charitable Trusts, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Aug. 13, 1998, at 1279.
29. See generally, Hyman, supra note 8. Compare generally the observations in
the GAO Report, supra note 10, to those contained in Miller, supra note 3.
30. See Pimley, supra note 28, at 1279.
31. See Bisesi, supra note 27, at 806.
32. See id. at 820.
33. See Stampone, supra note 1, at 644.
34. See id.
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of nonprofit hospitals to raise needed capital.3 5 Conversely, forprofit entities have relative ease in accessing private and public
equity markets to raise capital for facility replacement and
expansion.36
The practical economic handicaps facing nonprofit hospitals
often leave hospital closure as the only alternative to a nonprofit's conversion to for-profit status. Consumer groups rarely
adequately consider this economic reality. Closure would almost certainly reduce the market value of the charitable assets
and completely eliminate access to the very care that is asserted
as a primary focus of consumer groups. Rather than focusing on
the prohibition of conversions, it is more critical to ensure continued access to quality health care services in the local community and to provide for adequate regulation and monitoring of
post-transaction activities. Appropriate restrictions on the subsequent use of conversion proceeds will guard against a much
greater squandering of charitable assets.
If the economic pressure being exerted on nonprofit hospitals
by the combination of health care reform and managed care
cost-cutting is acknowledged, the issue becomes not how to impede conversions but rather how to maximize public benefit.
State and federal controls need to concentrate on two major
components of the conversion process: (1) ensuring that fair
value is paid for charitable assets, and (2) establishing an ongoing and effective system to regulate and monitor the subsequent
use of the conversion proceeds.
'37
While there is always a possibility for abuse by "insiders
related to price negotiations, there is little empirical data to seriously suggest that directors of nonprofit hospitals do not attempt to determine an appropriate sales price, which is the
35. Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a nonprofit hospital's ability to raise
capital for future endeavors was severely restricted. This Act reduced the amount of
a tax-exempt bond issuance that a nonprofit hospital could allocate to non-exempt
business operations, such as the building of medical office buildings, from 25% to 5%.
See I.R.C. § 145(a) (1998). See also Singer, supra note 14, at 227; Fishman supra note
2, at 713.
36. See Fishman, supra note 2, at 712-13.
37. Insiders are persons whose relationship with a nonprofit entity allows them
the opportunity to make use of the charitable organization's income or assets for personal gain or benefit. Within the nonprofit hospital setting, these individuals typically
include officers, directors, board members and, under certain circumstances, physicians on the medical staff. An insiders' receipt of prohibited "benefits" is known as
private inurement. Private inurement is strictly prohibited and disqualifies an organization from tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 501(C)(3). See also 1980 G.C.M. 38,459
(July 31, 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
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result of many subjective considerations. 38 At times, a lower
sales price may be legitimate in exchange for contractual commitments from the purchaser to provide certain minimal levels
of health care to the indigent, above those mandated by existing
39
state or federal law.
The Association of Attorneys General, as well as a number of
prominent consumer groups, has developed model conversion
codes and checklists for states to use as guidelines when considering specific legislative enactments. 40 The most detailed and
specific, the Model Code developed by the Association of Attorneys General,41 will be considered.
This article will begin its analysis in Section I by discussing the
historical and current status of conversion activity. Foundations
resulting from conversion activity will also be reviewed. Section
II will analyze and critique the National Association of Attorneys General's ("NAAG") Model Conversion Code. Thereafter, Section II will survey the seventeen states, and the District
of Columbia, that have enacted legislation relating to the sale of
nonprofit hospital assets.42 The survey will endeavor to collate
the similarities, note the disparities and question the statutory
omissions. Where appropriate, a short comment and comparison will be made between the Model Code and the trends that
have developed in the state enactments.
Although there are many approaches to analyzing model
codes and state-specific legislation, Section II will focus on the
preservation of charitable assets and the public's interest in continued access to affordable health care services, by addressing
six issues: (1) the scope of the statutes to determine the specific
transactions covered; (2) notice requirements-for those statutes that require governmental approval, time limitations and
public hearing requirements will be considered; (3) the provisions relating to valuation of the nonprofit's assets; (4) community impact assessments and access-to-care provisions; (5)
38. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 11-14.
39. This group includes the working poor who lack or have inadequate health
insurance and do not qualify for Medicare or Medicaid coverage benefits.
40. See Seto, supra note 14, at 56. The National Association of Attorneys General
submitted a draft model act with commentary at the NAAG Summer Meeting in Durango, Colorado, July 11-16, 1998. See Miller, supra note 3, at § 4.
41. See id.
42. This article will discuss the District of Columbia legislation as though it were a
sovereign state because the preservation of charitable assets and access-to-care issues
are identical.
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enforcement and monitoring provisions; and (6) restrictions on
the subsequent use and disposition of the conversion proceeds.
Section III will briefly discuss federal avenues of oversight
available to protect nonprofit assets. Section IV will conclude
with a recommended course of action to implement adequate
safeguards to insure that the nonprofit hospital's assets are maximized and that the subsequent use of conversion proceeds continues to fulfill the original charitable mission of the nonprofit
hospital.
I.

THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT STATUS OF

CONVERSION AcTIvITY

In order to fully understand the development of conversion
legislation, a short overview of states' pre-existing authority to
protect charitable assets is warranted. Common law authority
to protect charitable assets stems primarily from two charitable
trust law doctrines: parens patriae43 and cy pres.44 State statutory authority is established through the enactment of nonprofit
corporation legislation.
A.

Charitable Trust Law

Parenspatriae refers to "the power of the state to protect the
public's interest in assets pledged to public purposes. '4 5 It authorizes the state attorney general to bring suit to enforce charitable trusts and protect charitable assets from misapplication.46
The common law concept of parens patriae also provides attorneys general with the authority to oversee charities as the representative of the public.4 7 While attorneys general cannot
prohibit a nonprofit hospital from converting to for-profit status,
they can regulate the transaction to insure that limitations on
43. This doctrine literally means "parent of the country" and traditionally refers
"to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. It
is the concept utilized to protect quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and
the welfare of the people, interstate water rights and general economy of the state."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1003 (5'I ed., 1979).
44. The translation of this term is "as near as [possible]." It refers to a "rule for
the construction of instruments in equity, by which the intention of the parties is carried out as near as may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it a literal
effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 349 (5'I ed., 1979).
45. See Shannon McGhee Hernandez, Conversions of Nonprofit Hospitals to ForProfit Status: The Tennessee Experience, 28 U. MEM. L. REV.1077, 1096-00 (1998).
46. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)TRUSTS § 391, at 279 (1959).
47. See Bisesi, supra note 27, at 813.
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the disposal of charitable assets are respected. 48 Attorneys general do not have the inherent authority to prohibit either the
sale of charitable assets or the dissolution of a charitable trust.49
Charitable trust law, however, does limit the alternative uses of
"converted" charitable assets. 50
While charitable corporations such as nonprofit hospitals are
not the equivalent of a charitable trust,51 the assets of a charitable corporation are typically impressed with a charitable trust
limiting the disposition of the charitable assets. 2 Thus, while a
hospital may be authorized to sell its assets, the use of the sales
proceeds is normally limited by the nonprofit's bylaws and mission statements.53 While courts usually grant nonprofit directors
broad discretion in managing day-to-day operations, this deference is not extended to fundamental
changes in the nonprofit
5 4
corporation's purpose or mission.
48. See id.
49. See Singer, supra note 14, at 238.
50. See Hernandez, supra note 46, at 1096.
51. A charitable trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising
as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by
whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose." RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). See Bisesi, supra note
27, at 807-808. A nonprofit corporation is created by state nonprofit statutory authority and governed by its articles of incorporation and by-laws. See id., at 808.
Although trusts are governed by common law and statutory rules for trusts, the rules
applicable to nonprofit corporations and trusts are similar. See id. To the extent a
nonprofit corporation desires to qualify for federal tax-exempt status, it must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. See supra note 37.
52. See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 6. A California case has explained that "the
assets of a corporation organized solely for charitable purposes must be deemed to be
impressed with a charitable trust by virtue of the express declaration of the corporation's purposes, and notwithstanding the absence of any express declaration by those
who contribute such assets as to the purpose for which the contributions are made."
Queen of Angels v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3rd 359, 364 (1977). See also Taylor Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d 741, 750 (Mo. 1952); Miller, supra note 3, §2, at 9. The California
Appellate Court went on to explain that the Queen of Angels Hospital had represented itself to donors, the public and state and federal tax authorities as a hospital,
and that its attempt to lease its facilities to another organization constituted the abandonment of its charitable purposes and thereby violated the trust imposed on its assets. See 66 Cal. App. 3d at 364.
53. See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 6, and see also cases cited therein. See generally, Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hospital, 494 N.E.2d 1018 (Mass. 1985).
54. See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 2-3. While nonprofit directors are entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule, whereby the courts will not second guess
the objective reasonableness of the director's decision, this rule will only be applied
where the directors can demonstrate that they have met the appropriate process requirements imposed by the duty of care, such as obtaining the assistance of competent
experts and considering all competing offers. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
859, 873 (Del. 1985). See also Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
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The doctrine of cy pres, which literally means "as nearly as

possible," requires a trustee to secure court authorization to deviate from the original trust purpose. Under the doctrine of cy
pres, a nonprofit charitable corporation is required to obtain
court approval before proceeding with any fundamental change
in its corporate purpose or mission.56 Traditionally, before a
nonprofit corporation will be granted authority to alter its original corporate mission, a court must find that the original mission
of the nonprofit or the intent of the donor is impossible, impractical or illegal to carry out. 57 The attorney general's historic
duty to supervise, enforce and protect the public interest in

charitable trusts automatically renders him a party to any cy

pres proceeding. 58 Although the states do not apply the cy pres
doctrine uniformly, 59 a strict application would curtail most non-

profit hospital conversions, because conversion proceeds are not
typically dedicated to the organization's original purpose-inpatient hospital services. 6°
Arguably, the common law charitable trust doctrine 6 1 and the
requirement of cy pres together normally would require that
foundations created through the sale of charitable assets adopt a

mission statement closely related to the nonprofit's original mission statement.62 Historically, courts took a strict view relating
to the use of charitable assets and required the trustee to estab-

lish: (1) that it was impossible or at least impractical to accomplish the stated purpose of the trust, and (2) that the proposed
55. See Hernandez, supra note 45, at 1096.
56. See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 2. Cy pres is an equitable doctrine under which
courts may authorize trustees to use charitable assets in a way different, but as near as
possible, from that intended by the donor, if the donor's intended use has become
impossible or impractical. See id., § 2 at 5. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 (1959); FiSHMAN, supra note 2, at 716; Hernandez, supra note 45, at
1096; Naomi Ono, Boardsof Directors under Fire:an Examination of Nonprofit Board
Duties in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 130-33 (1998).
57. Bisesi, supra note 31, at 810. Some states also recognize the doctrine of deviation, which is similar to cy pres but has less stringent standards. This doctrine allows a
charitable entity a restriction on its charitable assets if the restriction would defeat the
intended charitable purpose of the gift. See id.
58. See Brown v. Memorial National Home Foundation, 329 P.2d 118, 132 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958); See also Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 3, 15.
59. See generally id.
60. See Hernandez, supra note 45, at 1097.
61. The charitable trust doctrine creates a strict fiduciary requirement that converted charitable assets continue to serve the stated mission of the charity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 372 (1959). See also Hernandez, supra note 45, at
1096; Ono, supra note 56, at 131.
62. See Laurie Larson, How Does Your Foundation Grow?, 51 TRUSTEE 11, 12.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1999

9

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 8

alternative use of the trust assets came as close as possible to the
original intent of the donor. More recently, a growing number
of states have not strictly or uniformly enforced this principle as
it applies to the subsequent disposition of hospital conversion
proceeds.63
B.

Legislative Authorization for Nonprofit Corporations

In more recent times, state nonprofit corporate law enactments 64 have generally eased the restrictions relating to a nonprofit corporation's dedication of its charitable assets upon
dissolution.65 The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act
simply requires that a nonprofit corporation, upon dissolution,
distribute its assets in accordance with its articles of incorporation or by-laws. 66 In addition, most state nonprofit statutory authority does not require the nonprofit entity to report to the
attorney general or secure court approval before distributing its
assets to another charitable organization.67 To the extent that a
nonprofit hospital is established under a state's nonprofit corporate code, general prohibitions on conflicts of interest and legislative restrictions on the disposal of assets on dissolution would
provide limited authority to oversee hospital conversions.68
Attorneys general, in recent years, have become increasingly
more aggressive in protecting charitable assets, even without
specific statutory authority. This increased oversight is justified,
because the sale of a nonprofit hospital's assets results in a fundamental change in the hospital's corporate purpose and mission. However, such initiatives taken by attorneys general may
63. See Hernandez, supra note 45, at 1096 (citing Thomas Silk, Conversions of
Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations:Federal Tax Law and State CharitableLaw Issues, 13 TAx-EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 745, 746 (1998) (predicting a judicial softening
of the doctrine of cy pres)). See generally Bisesi, supra note 27, at 837.
64. "The Revised Model Code Nonprofit Corporations Act ("RMNCA") essentially defines a public benefit corporation to mean the same entity as a charitable
organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code." Bisesi, supra
note 27, at 810 (citing RMNCA §§ 1.40(28), 17.07(3) and (4) (1987)). Most states
exempt charitable entities that qualify for federal tax-exemption from income, real
property and sales taxation. See id. at 811.
65. See Hernandez, supra note 45, at 1097.
66. See id. See also RMNCA § 14.069(a)(5) (1987). The revised act eased the
restrictions found in the original model act, which required that the asset of a charitable corporation, upon dissolution, be transferred to an entity engaged in substantially
similar activities. See id. at § 46.
67. See Bisesi, supra note 27, at 810.
68. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 23. The assets of nonprofit corporations
are often viewed as being held in public trusts.
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have lulled some states into a false sense of security that specific
legislative action is unnecessary.69
Conversion legislation is still needed, because the application
of common law doctrines and nonprofit legislation can result in
significant disparities in the discretion afforded the nonprofit
hospital in the subsequent disposition of conversion proceeds.
Strict application of cy pres would limit the use of conversion
proceeds to inpatient hospital services. Liberal nonprofit legislation would allow conversion proceeds to be utilized for any
activity authorized by the nonprofit hospital's articles of incorporation or by-laws. Conversion legislation is necessary to ensure that the proceeds resulting from the sale of nonprofit
hospital assets are either distributed to other charities with substantially similar missions or used for the provision of health
care in the affected community.
C. FoundationActivity
The majority of conversion transactions result in the creation
of foundations to receive and administer conversion proceeds.
Since 1973, eighty-one conversion foundations 70 have been created with assets totaling $9.3 billion. 71 Net proceeds reported
from the fourteen conversions reviewed by the GAO totaled
$930 million. 72 Twelve of those non-profit hospitals directed
their sales proceeds to charitable foundations that adopted
broadly defined missions primarily focusing on health and wellness. 73 The for-profit hospital or joint venture boards that result
from conversions are typically responsible for monitoring and
ensuring compliance with transaction obligations.74
Despite the enormous shifting of charitable assets, there is little in the way of legal precedent for these transactions. 75 Indi69. See Pimley, supra note 28, at 1280.
70. Foundations can be public or private charities. Private charitable foundations
must place their capital in endowments and invest the principal. Private foundations
must pay annual excise taxes on their net investments and must issue grants minimally
amounting to five percent of their calculated total assets. See I.R.C. §§ 4940-45. Private charitable foundations must raise a certain percentage of their money from public donations and demonstrate that they are serving community needs. See id.
71. More than half of these have been created in the last three years. See Larson,
supra note 62, at 12.
72. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 5. See also Miller, supra note 3, § 1, at 1
(concluding that most hospital conversions result in the creation of foundations).
73. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 5.
74. See id.
75. See Miller, supra note 3, § 1, at 2.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1999

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 8

viduals attempting to develop appropriate structure, board
composition, or missions for newly created foundations often
find no regulatory guidance.7 6 Use of charitable assets is typically defined by the mission the foundation adopts, which often
is not required to have a limited focus. 77 Foundation governance differs from hospital governance in that it requires a more
hands-on approach in determining adherence to its mission and
gauging the continued health needs of the community?78 Foundation boards do not routinely seek, through public forums or
needs assessments, community input relating to the subsequent
use of conversion funds.79 Community input was obtained in
only six of the fourteen conversions studied by the GAO. °
According to the GAO Report, most foundations focused on
health and wellness, but funding for non-health related activities
including education, public safety, arts and religious activities,
was also provided.8 ' Conversion proceeds have been used for
non-health related projects such as: building schools, supporting
an aerospace program, and financing arts, education and technology centers.82 The sale of the Tennessee hospital, Goodlark
Regional Medical Center, is illustrative. That sale resulted in
the creation of the Jackson Foundation, whose proceeds were
used, in part, to fund an aerospace program and a technology
center fostering programs in math and science.83 Foundation
funds from another Tennessee conversion purchased airplanes
so that students at the local school could take flying lessons. 81
Some foundation boards oppose using foundation money to
fund acute medical care. Rather, they argue foundation grants
should take the long view, and concentrate on programs such as
primary care education, disease prevention, public health and
health policy, and research. They argue that continued indigent
care and medical education costs should be part of the negotiated responsibility of the for-profit purchaser, or else the foundations will simply be funneling the purchase price back to the
purchaser.85
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id.
See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 18.
See Larson, supra note 62, at 12.
See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 5.
See id.
See id. at 18.
See id. at 5, 18-20.
See id. at 19-21.
See Seto, supra note 14, at 13.
See generally Larson, supra note 62, at 12.
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This position, however, ignores the original basis for extending tax-exempt status to the converting hospital-the provision of acute inpatient health care to the local community,
including its indigent population. Taking into account the basis
of tax-exemption, the more persuasive view is that conversion
proceeds belong to the affected community in which the assets
were generated and that foundation grant activity should be restricted to the alleviation of acute sickness and disease in the
local community. Ambitious goals that extend beyond the community, such as fostering appropriate national health policies
and formulating general education programs, are akin to lobbying and should not be funded with conversion proceeds.86
Recognizing these conflicting philosophies, a number of state
conversion enactments declare that nonprofit health facilities,
including nonprofit hospitals, hold their assets in trust for the
public, and that those assets are irrevocably dedicated, as a condition of their tax-exempt status, to the specific charitable purposes set forth in the nonprofit's articles of incorporation.87
Only thorough regulation and continuous monitoring will provide consistency to the administration and preservation of conversion proceeds. With proper oversight, the public can be
assured that foundation grant-making activities serve the ongoing health care needs of the affected community.
II.

ANALYSIS OF

NAAG's

MODEL CONVERSION ACT AND

CURRENT STATE ENACTMENTS

A.

NAAG's Model Conversion Act

The National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG")
issued draft model legislation on March 31, 1998, outlining a
suggested statutory framework to regulate conversion activities
of nonprofit hospitals.88 This legislation is intended to protect
the public's interest in the charitable assets of nonprofit hospitals by rigorously enforcing charitable trust laws. 89 The NAAG's
Model Act is the most comprehensive model legislation. It
seems to represent a consensus among the country's attorneys
86. See generally id. A tax-exempt corporation is prohibited from engaging in lobbying activities. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(a)(3).
87. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West 1998) (historical notes referring to § 1 of
Stats. 1996, c. 1105 (A.B. 3101)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-551(1)-(7) (1981); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2115.11 (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.45.010 (1998).

88. See Model Guidelines: NAAG Issues Model Conversion Guidelines Requiring
Notification, Approval of State AGs, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Apr. 9, 1998, at 585.
89. See id.
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general, pursuant to their parens patriae authority, 90 as to the
issues that the states consider important in the conversion of
nonprofit hospitals. The legislation is designed to provide sufficient flexibility so that it can be adapted to each state's unique
trust laws. 91 The Executive Director and General Counsel of
NAAG, Christine T. Milliken, explained that the primary goal
of the Model Act is to insure that health care transactions are
open to public comment and scrutiny.92
1.

Scope

The Model Act defines a nonprofit health care conversion
transaction as:
the sale, transfer, lease, exchange, optioning, conveyance, or
other disposition of a material amount of a nonprofit health
care entity's assets or operations to a for-profit corporation,
mutual benefit corporation or other person; and (2) the transfer of control or governance of a material amount of a nonprofit health care entity's assets or operations to a for-profit
corporation, mutual benefit corporation or other person. 93

This language is designed to be all-inclusive. Considering the
developing trend to accomplish conversions by utilizing a partnership or joint venture format, the expansive definition is warranted. Despite its broad scope, the Act contains a significant
omission-the lack of a concise quantitative definition of a "material amount." Although transactions involving fifty percent or
more of a nonprofit's assets would undoubtedly fall within the
parameters of this provision, an open issue remains-whether
the initial threshold for statutory disclosure and compliance begins with transactions involving twenty, thirty or forty percent of
a nonprofit hospital's assets. This provision also fails to consider
the effect of multiple transactions involving related parties over
a short period of time.
90. For the definition of this term see supra note 43.
91.

See Model Guidelines, supra note 88, at 585.

92. See Christine T. Milliken, Comments on Model Healthcare Conversion,
NAAG, Mar. 31, 1998. Ms. Milliken also noted, "The general principal behind charitable trust laws is that such trusts are not private business entities, and that the public,
therefore, has a greater interest in how those trusts are treated because of its investment in them and its reliance on their services." Id.
93. See PROPOSED MODEL ACT FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSION
TRANSACTIONS, NAAG, Mar. 31, 1996, at § 1.02 ("NAAG MODEL AC"). A person
includes any individual, partnership, trust, estate, corporation, association, joint venture, joint stock company, insurance company, or other organization. See id. at § 1.04.
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A better approach would require disclosure and approval
when the nature of governance at the nonprofit institution is affected. This threshold occurs at levels significantly below a fifty
percent change in ownership or control. Reporting requirements should be activated: (1) when a transaction involves the
sale of twenty percent or more of a nonprofit's assets; (2) at any
amount if the asset sale will change the nature of the services
historically provided by the nonprofit entity; or (3) when the
community's representation on the nonprofit's hospital board is
diluted. Additionally, multiple transactions occurring within a
five-year period between related parties should be evaluated
collectively to determine if the aggregate purchases amount to a
twenty percent change in ownership or control or change the
nature of services historically provided by the nonprofit entity.
2.

Notice, Public Disclosure and Approval
(a) Notice

The Model Act requires that the nonprofit hospitals provide
written notice to, and obtain the approval of, the attorney general prior to entering into any nonprofit health care conversion
transaction. 94 Notice must include all information that the attorney general determines is required.95 Within sixty days of a
completed written notice, the attorney general is required to notify the nonprofit health care entity in writing of its decision to
approve or disapprove the proposed transaction.96 The attorney
general may extend the period an additional ninety days to obtain necessary information to complete his review, contract with
consultants or receive advice from federal or any other state
agency.97 The failure to "provide timely information" requested
by the attorney general is sufficient grounds to disapprove a
conversion transaction. 98 All documents submitted to the attorney general in connection with the proposed nonprofit health
care conversion are deemed public records. 99
94. See id. at § 2.01. This section provides for alternative notice to the appropriate
court on the advice of the attorney general in mandatory cy pres proceeding states.
95.

See id.

96.

See id. at §§ 3.01, 6.02 and 7.01.

97.

See id.

98. See id. at § 6.02
99. See id. at § 8.01. This section includes language to safeguard trade secrets or
other commercially competitive information. Some commentators claim that public
participation and disclosure in the sales transaction could be detrimental to the value
of the selling hospital or result in disclosure of trade secrets. See also GAO Report,
supra note 10, at 18. However, research reveals no hard data to support this concern.
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While the mechanics of the notice requirement are adequate
to provide the parties with an expected review timetable, the
Model Act does not enumerate the specific documentation that
is to be included in the notice submission. Rather the Act provides the attorney general with discretion to determine "required" documentation. Although the Model Act authorizes
the attorney general to adopt regulations or to establish protocols, it does not require him to do so. 100 If conversion legislation
fails to enumerate the documentation necessary to complete the
notice requirement, the attorney general should be required,
prior to enforcement, to develop and publish detailed regulations itemizing the expected submissions. A more expedient approach would be to enumerate the usual and customary
documentation that is expected of the parties while allowing for
supplemental document requests based on the particular conversion application. Standardization will provide a framework
for evaluating competitive bidding and will reduce the likelihood of due process challenges stemming from inconsistent
enforcement.
Despite the discretion granted the attorney general in approving conversion transactions, another shortcoming of the Model
Act is its failure to require the parties to include specific provisions in the transaction documents detailing: (1) the minimum
level of continued health care services that the purchaser will
provide to the affected community and (2) the intended use of
the conversion proceeds by the seller. The statute should prohibit deviation from these representations absent court
approval.
More flexibility could be added to the approval process if the
attorney general were authorized to extend conditional approval. Conditional approval authority would provide the attorney general with sufficient leverage to "rewrite" limited aspects
of the conversion transaction to ensure that fair value is paid for
the charitable assets and that an effective system to regulate and
monitor the subsequent use of conversion proceeds has been
established.

To the extent that trade secrets are a concern, public notice of sale and solicitations
for bidding could be commenced without disclosure of trade secrets. Thereafter, once
appropriate confidentiality agreements are executed, limited disclosure of confidential or sensitive information could be disclosed to only the most serious bidders.
100. See NAAG MODEL Acr § 6.01.
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(b)

Public Disclosure

The Model Act requires, prior to issuance of a written decision, that the attorney general publish written notice and conduct at least one public meeting in the county where the
nonprofit entity is located. 10 1 The purpose of the hearing is to
solicit comments from interested persons desiring to make statements concerning the proposed conversion. 0 2 Requiring publication only fourteen days prior to the public hearing has two
shortcomings: (1) it provides insufficient time for community
groups and other interested persons to become familiar with the
details of the proposed transaction or to seek alternative solutions to the sale of charitable assets; and (2) it does not require
the nonprofit hospital or the acquiring entity to provide public
notice of the intent to enter into a conversion transaction.
Additionally, the Model Act fails to state the purpose for
soliciting public comment. There is no requirement that the
transacting parties respond to legitimate public inquiry. Nor
does the statute explain how public sentiment is to be factored
into the approval process. Conversion legislation should require
an explicit response to legitimate community concerns relating
to the valuation of charitable assets and the continued access to
affordable health care. The use of conditional approval authority would be an excellent method for an attorney general to convert community input into mandatory conversion commitments.
(c)

Approval

The Model Act provides an outline for the attorney general to
use when determining whether a proposed transaction should be
approved. The attorney general must consider: (1) whether the
proposed transaction will result in a breach of fiduciary duty,
including conflicts of interest; (2) whether the transaction will
result in private inurement; (3) whether the nonprofit health
care entity will receive full and fair market value for its charitable and social welfare assets or whether the value has been
manipulated by parties to the transaction; (4) whether the proceeds of the proposed transaction will be used in a manner consistent with the trust under which the assets are held and will be
independent of the control of the acquiror or its related entities;
(5) whether sufficient information has been provided, upon rea101.
102.

See id. at § 4.01.
See id.
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sonable request, to evaluate the transaction and its effects on the
public; (6) whether the health care entity exercised due diligence in disposing of nonprofit health care assets, in selecting
the acquiring entity and in negotiating the terms and conditions
of the conversion; (7) whether the terms of any management or
services contracts negotiated in conjunction with the proposed
transaction are reasonable; and (8) whether any foundation established to hold the proceeds of the sale will be broadly based
in and representative of the affected community. 10 3
These criteria cover the basic issues likely to arise when considering the propriety of a nonprofit hospital's request to dispose of charitable assets. Authorization to seek the advice of
other state and federal agencies allows the attorney general to
utilize existing governmental expertise without duplicating expenses. It fosters a multi-disciplinary approach to evaluating
conversion proposals by allowing state charitable law and health
care issues to be considered in tandem with federal tax-exempt
requirements and prohibitions.1 " If these review elements are
thoroughly explored with the transacting parties, they are sufficient to insure that a fair price is received for charitable assets.
However, general criteria, such as requiring foundations to be
broadly based in the community, are insufficient to safeguard
foundation assets. Conversion legislation should limit the parties' post-transaction representation on newly created foundation boards to twenty percent. Statutory safeguards restricting
and monitoring the use of the conversions funds should also be
included in all legislation. Grant-making activities should be
limited to the ongoing health care needs of the affected community. Before a conversion is approved, the foundation should be
required to establish an effective ongoing system to regulate,
monitor and disclose potential conflicts of interest. The attorney general's review must include a verification that the foundation has adopted a mission statement comparable to the mission
of the converting hospital.
3.

Valuation

The Model Act mandates that the attorney general consider
whether the nonprofit health care entity is receiving full and fair
103. See id. at § 5.01(1)-(10).
104. A discussion of relevant tax-exempt requirements and prohibitions can be
found in Section IV(B), Federal Tax Consideration.
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market value °5 for its charitable assets.10 6 To assist in making
this determination, the attorney general may, within the time
period designated, contract with, consult, and receive advice
from any agency of the state or federal government. 7 It also
retains the sole discretion to contract with appropriate experts
or consultants to review the proposed conversion transaction. 10 8
The attorney general is entitled to reimbursement from the nonprofit entity for all reasonable and actual costs incurred in reviewing a proposed conversion transaction, including attorney
fees at the attorney general's billing rate for state agencies. 10 9
The nonprofit's failure to promptly reimburse the attorney general for all costs incurred in the review of the proposed transaction is sufficient grounds to disapprove the conversion. 110
Pursuant to the attorney general's authority to adopt regulations facilitating the conversion review, a standard document
submission list and review protocol should be implemented
prior to enforcing conversion legislation. Determinations of fair
value would be significantly more accurate if the parties to the
transaction were required to disclose: (1) all contract documents, including schedules and warranties; (2) promises or discussions of future employment or consulting agreements; and
(3) any limitations relating to the board of any subsequently created foundation or to representation of the parties, or their affiliates thereon.
If the for-profit purchaser is permitted to acquire substantial,
but not necessarily majority, representation on the board of a
newly created foundation, then the true value of transaction
commitments can be jeopardized. There is an inherent conflict
of interest between a for-profit's desire to maximize profit and a
charitable foundation's mission to serve the health care needs of
the community. Although post-transaction enforcement by the
105. The IRS and valuation consultants cite the income, market, and cost approaches as generally accepted methods for valuing hospital assets. See GAO Report,
supra note 10, at 9.
106. See NAAG MODEL Acr § 5.01(3).
107. See id. at § 7.01(1).
108. See id. at § 7.01(2). Expert or consultant costs incurred are the responsibility
of the nonprofit health care entity providing notice pursuant to this statute. See id. at
§7.02. This section further provides that the attorney general shall be exempt from
statutory bidding procedures, but costs incurred pursuant to this section shall not exceed an amount that is reasonable and necessary to conduct the review. In theory this
section would allow a nonprofit entity to challenge costs incurred by the attorney
general to the extent that they exceed what would be considered fair and reasonable.
109. See id. at § 7.03.
110. See id. at § 7.04.
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foundation is always problematic, maintaining foundation independence is the only viable method to remove the influences of
the surviving for-profit entity so that vigorous enforcement of
transaction obligations is at least possible.
It is important to note that attorney general review does not
result in an affirmative finding that fair market value has been
received. Assuming, however, that the transacting parties provide full and fair disclosure of the transaction to the attorney
general, the parties should have a measure of confidence that a
post-acquisition review or claim of excess benefit will not ensue.
4.

Community Impact Assessments and Access to
Care Provisions
The Model Act's primary provisions neither include nor recommend that states adopt health impact considerations as part
of the conversion approval process. Rather, the Model Act provides an optional section for those states "who deem it appropriate" to consider health impact issues as part of their conversion
review process. 1 ' The optional provisions direct the attorney
general to determine whether the proposed conversion transaction may have a significant effect on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community." 2 The
attorney general is to consider: (1) whether sufficient safeguards
have been included in the conversion documents to ensure the
community has continued access to affordable care; 113 (2)
whether the transaction is likely to have an adverse effect on the
access, availability or cost of health care services in the community;" 4 (3) whether health care providers have been offered an
opportunity to invest in the acquiring entity; 15 and (4) whether
the acquiring entity has made a commitment at least comparable
to the nonprofit entity to provide health care to the disadvantaged, uninsured and underinsured, as well as6 providing benefits
to the community to promote health care."1
Optional provisions are inherently problematic. The term
"optional" suggests that these considerations are unnecessary or
less important. However, from the public's perspective, affordability and access to health care are of primary importance.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at § 5.02.
NAAG MODEL ACT § 5.02.
id. at § 5.02(1).
id. at § 5.02(2).
id. at § 5.02(3).
id. at § 5.02(4).
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An additional shortcoming is that the Model Act authorizes
the attorney general to consider the health care activities and
funding of the nonprofit entity or its successor foundation, including medical education, research and teaching programs,
when evaluating the for-profit purchaser's compliance with community health care commitments." 7 This provision is fraught
with danger and potential abuse. At best, it blurs the purchaser's independent responsibility to provide affordable health
care to the affected community. At worst, it creates a conduit to
funnel a portion of the purchase price back to the purchaser by
reducing the purchaser's financial obligation to provide affordable health care to the affected community's indigent population.
To insure that collusion does not invade the transaction or allow the resulting foundation to become a mere extension of the
for-profit purchaser, the rights, duties and responsibilities of
seller and purchaser should be distinct and separately evaluated.
The obligations of the nonprofit hospital, or any subsequently
created foundation, to continue its charitable mission should
never be tied to the obligations and undertakings of the acquiring entity. Charitable funds should not be dissipated to offset
for-profit obligations.
The operation of a for-profit health care facility should entail
separate and distinct requirements to provide minimum levels of
community-based health care to the indigent and underinsured
population as a condition of continued licensure and participation in federal health care programs." 8 However, the imposition of the charitable obligations on the for-profit must be
balanced by the fiscal restraints spawned by the reduction in
Medicare payments and other health care reforms. It is equally
inappropriate to burden the purchaser with unrealistic obligations as it is to allow the purchaser to underwrite for-profit obligations with charitable funds.
The best protection for the public is to specifically identify
and enumerate the independent obligations of each party to the
117. See id.
118. There are minimally mandated federal health care provisions such as The
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"). This statute
was enacted in response to widespread patient dumping. It requires that any hospital
that accepts Medicare payments and that operates an emergency room, undertake "an
appropriate medical screening examination" of individuals who present themselves to
the hospital's emergency room to determine whether that individual has an emergency medical condition. If so, the hospital is required to stabilize the individual
before effectuating a transfer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd et seq. (1997).
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conversion. The inclusion of these undertakings in the transaction documents provides a basis for the attorney general and
community groups to enforce the obligations post-acquisition. 119
Otherwise, continued care provisions may become meaningless
because the nonprofit entity may not maintain a vested interest
in enforcement once it has received the conversion proceeds.
Finally, the Model Act does not specifically direct the attorney general to consider the continued economic viability of the
nonprofit hospital in the event that conversion is disapproved.
Viability should be a fundamental consideration when evaluating any conversion transaction. It is not only a crucial element
in determining a fair value for the assets sold, but it is also pivotal in determining whether the affected community is likely to
receive continued access to affordable health care.
5. Enforcement/Monitoring and Remedies/Penalties
The Model Act provides that any conversion transaction that
violates the notice, review or approval requirements shall be
null and void and that each member of the governing boards
and the chief financial officers of the parties to the conversion
transaction are subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000,000.120
The attorney general is authorized to institute proceedings to
impose such a penalty. 121 In addition, no permit to operate a
hospital may be issued or renewed if a nonprofit health care
conversion transaction is entered into in violation of the Act. 22
Finally, the Model Act explicitly states that nothing in the Act
shall be construed to limit the common law authority of the attorney general to protect charitable trusts and charitable
assets.

23

119. The Model Act attempts a similar concept by requiring the conversion transaction to demonstrate that the public's interest will be served, especially considering
the essential medical services needed to provide safe and adequate treatment, appropriate access and balanced health care delivery to the residents. See NAAG MODEL
Acr § 5.02(7). However, this section fails to independently delineate the responsibility of the contracting parties.
120. See id. at § 9.01. These penalties are in addition to, not a replacement for,
any other civil or criminal actions, under either common law or statutory law, including rescinding the transaction. See id. at § 9.02. The health care entity is required to
provide and certify that each member of the board of trustees of the nonprofit health
care entity was provided a copy of the Model Act when the entity provided its initial
conversion notice to the attorney general. See id. at § 2.01.
121. See NAAG MODEL Acr § 9.01.
122. See id.
123. See id. at § 9.02.
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The remedy provisions of the Model Act are excellent. They
not only invalidate the transaction but also impose personal liability upon the officers and directors of the transacting parties.
The substantial monetary penalty is an effective deterrent to unauthorized conversions. The impact of conversion legislation
could be strengthened if conversion legislation included similar
penalties for providing false or misleading information to the attorney general during the notice and approval process.
Considering the challenge of monitoring and enforcing posttransaction commitments, the conversion legislation should authorize private individuals to bring relator or qui tam suits 124 on
behalf of the state to insure that the public receives the full benefit of transaction obligations and to insure that the conversion
proceeds are used for appropriate health care activities.
6.

Restrictions on Subsequent Use and Disposition of
Conversion Proceeds

The Model Act does not include, or recommend as an option,
any statutory provisions providing for the monitoring or regulating of the use or disposition of conversion proceeds. Nor does
the Model Act require formal disclosure of the foundation's
mission statement or the protocol for grant-making as part of
the approval process.
Because the creation of the nonprofit hospital's assets resulted from the provision of health care in the community, conversion legislation should establish a mechanism to assess and
monitor the health care needs of the affected community. Once
these needs are determined, foundation funds should be restricted to meet them. Conversion legislation should also provide regulatory guidance and explicit limitations on the use of
124.

Qui tam actions, translated as "who as well...," are claims "brought by an

informer, [also known as a "relator"] under a statute that establishes a penalty for the
commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be recoverable in civil actions, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action

and the remainder to the state or some other institution."

BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY

1126 (5th ed. 1979). The False Claims Act is an excellent illustration of the use of qui
tam provisions that have successfully encouraged employees and others to report instances of fraud against the federal government. See generally, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et
seq.; Efrem M. Grail, "Qui Tam" Insuranceand the False Claim Act Settlements, ABA
HEALTh LAW., Oct. 1998, at 16. Qui tam suits are also referred to as a relator action.
A relator is a private party authorized to bring suit in the name of the state or attorney general when the right to sue is vested exclusively in the attorney general. See
Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 17. See also Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 329
P.2d 118 (Cal Ct. App. 1958).
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conversion proceeds in order to provide guidance to the foundation board. The failure to promulgate effective procedures to
monitor post-transaction activities invites abuse, conflicts of interest and misdirected philanthropy. The use of charitable funds
for planes, playgrounds and museums, even if well intended,
jeopardizes the public's ability to ensure adequate health care
services for the affected community's under-insured and uninsured residents. The need to limit the focus of newly created
foundations is even more critical in situations where the forprofit purchaser reduces the services formerly provided by the
nonprofit entity or is less committed to providing necessary
health care to the indigent.
Representation by the former hospital's officers and directors
and the purchaser's affiliates on foundation boards should be
limited to no more than twenty percent to impede any attempt
by the parties to control the activities of the foundation. The
remaining eighty percent should be broadly representative of
the affected community. A representative of the attorney general should be appointed to the board of any resulting foundation for a minimum of five years. 125 Attorney general
participation in newly created boards will provide the state with
prior notice of the foundation's intended grant-making activities
before monies are actually allocated. To maintain a community
focus, newly created foundations should be required to conduct
an annual "needs assessment" study and to file a detailed annual
report for a similar five year period. This report should disclose
all grant-making activities and include an explanation of how
these activities have addressed the health care needs of the affected community. To encourage community input in foundation activities, the annual report should be immediately
available to the public.
While broadening the original mission of a nonprofit hospital
may be justified in certain situations, such alterations should
only be permitted upon petition and approval of the courts
where the attorney general, as a necessary party to the proceedings, can protect the public's interests. Foundations desiring to
deviate from the community-focused health care mission out-

125.

See Fishman, supra note 2, at 732-33.
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lined in the parties' approved conversion submission should be
required to do so in mandatory cy pres proceedings. 12 6
B.

State Conversion Legislation

Although common law and nonprofit corporation statutory
law provide state attorneys general limited authority to monitor
the conversion or dissolution of nonprofit entities,127 the myriad
social and legal issues that arise when nonprofit health care entities convert to for-profit has prompted a significant number of
states to consider legislation specifically addressing the health
care industry. As of September 1997, thirty-five states had considered, and nineteen states had enacted, legislation governing
nonprofit health care related conversions, mergers and acquisitions. 128 Statutory enactments regulate conversion activity of
health maintenance organizations ("HMO"), nonprofit and public hospitals and nonprofit insurance companies.129 This article
will limit its analysis to legislation regulating the130sale or conversion of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit entities.
As of November 1998, seventeen states (Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) and the District
of Columbia have enacted legislation specifically regulating the
sale of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit entities.' 3 This section
126. These limitations may present sensitive issues for hospitals with religious affiliations desiring to utilize conversion proceeds for apostleship. However, foundation funds should never be used to foster religious or political agendas.
127. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 6.
128. See Seto, supra note 14, at 2.
129. See generally Fishman, supra note 2, at 715.
130. It should be noted that many of the same issues arise with the conversion of
other types of nonprofit health care entities. The most significant issues common to
all types of nonprofit conversions are the determination of fair market value of the
charitable assets, the subsequent use of sale proceeds and the continuation of access
to health care, insurance and other health-related services. Thus, many of the comments advanced in this paper are appropriate when considering the consequences of
converting other nonprofit health care related entities. Although this article limits its
analysis to the application of the conversion statutes to nonprofit hospitals, there are
numerous conversion statutes that apply to nonprofit HMO, nonprofit to nonprofit
mergers, and mutualization of hospital and medical service corporations.
131. See ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 10-2591 to 10-2594 (1997); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 5913-5919 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-324 (1998); 1997 CONN. AcTs
188 (Reg. Sess.); 1998 CONN. Acrs 36 (Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-551 to 32560 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-400 to 31-7-412, 31-7-89.1 (1997); HAw. REV.
STAT. §§ 323D-1 to 323D-12 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. AN. §§ 40:2115.11 to 40:2115.22
(West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. §§ 6.5-101 to 6.5-307 (1998); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-327 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-20,102 to 71-20,114
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will analyze the state legislation collectively-collating the similarities, noting the disparities and questioning the omissions. It
will follow the same format utilized in the previous section to
facilitate comparisons to the Model Act.'32
Some of the enactments include statements of state interest.
Four states begin their legislation with the specific recognition of
the state's inherent interest in assuring the continued accessibility and affordability of health care facilities. 133 Washington and
Louisiana recognize the state's responsibility to protect the public's interest in nonprofit hospital assets and to ensure that these
assets are managed prudently and safeguarded consistent with
their missions. 3 The District of Columbia requires that charitable health care entities hold their assets in trust and that those
assets are irrevocably dedicated to the specific charitable purposes set forth in the entity's articles of incorporation. 135 Furthermore, the District of Columbia, recognizing that transfer of
nonprofit assets directly affects their charitable uses and may adassets,
versely affect the public as the beneficiary of charitable
1 36
considers specific legislative oversight a necessity.
1.

Scope

The vast majority of states define hospital conversions
broadly. 1 37 Typically, conversion acquisitions encompass any
person or group of persons who secures either an ownership or a
(1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19 et seq. (1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 109.34, 109.35, 109.99 (Anderson 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 65.800-65.815 (1997);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-1 to 23-17.14-31 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-24-17
(Michie 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-531 to 55-533 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 70.44.007, 70.44.240, 70.44.300 (1997); Wis. STAT. §§ 50.35, 165.40 (1997); 1997
Wis. LAWS 93.
132. The six major categories previously outlined include: (1) the scope of the
legislation, (2) notification, public disclosure and approval requirements, (3) valuation
of nonprofit hospital assets, (4) community impact assessment and access to care considerations, (5) enforcement, monitoring and penalties provisions, and (6) restrictions
on the subsequent use of charitable assets.
133. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (see historical notes referring to Sec. 1 of Stats.
1996, c. 1105 (A.B. 3101)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-551(1)-(7); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2115.11; WASH. REV. CODE. 70.45.010.
134. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40:2115.11; WASH. REV. CODE 70.45.010.
135. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-551(2).
136. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-551(4).
137. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-2592(A); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5914(a)(1); 1997
CONN. Acrs 188(1)(4); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-552(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2115.12(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20, 103(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(a);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.34(A)(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.803(1)(A), (B); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-4(6); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-331; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.020(3).
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controlling interest in a hospital by purchase, 139
merger, lease,
gift, 138 consolidation, joint venture or otherwise.
The threshold level of acquisition necessary to trigger the disclosure and approval requirements found in state conversion
legislation varies from the nonspecific "material" or "substantial" amount to specific percentages. Other states consider conversion transactions as part of the acquiror's total interest in the
nonprofit hospital when determining whether approval for the
purchase is required.
Three states define a regulated acquisition as:
any acquisition by a person or persons of an ownership interest in a hospital whether by purchase, merger, lease, gift or
otherwise, which results in a change of ownership or control of
twenty percent or greater or which results in the acquiror
holding a fifty percent or greater interest in the ownership or
control of a nonprofit hospital. 4 °
Rhode Island expands the terms "ownership and control" to include "possession," suggesting that an acquisition that is less
than a purchase and sale can nevertheless fall within the purview of the conversion regulation. Rhode Island's legislation is
also activated when the removal, addition or substitution of a
partner results in a new partner gaining or acquiring a controlling interest.' 4 ' Louisiana increases the level of acquisition nec1 42
essary to activate state oversight to thirty percent.
Ohio, using the term "transaction"' 43 in lieu of "conversion,"
includes the most conservative threshold provision-twenty percent. Ohio also considers the combined effect of multiple transactions occurring within a twenty-four month period when
calculating the percent threshold.4
The New Hampshire
threshold is twenty-five percent, but changes in membership of
138.
139.
140.

See

141.

See R.I.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 71-20, 103(3).

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 109.34 (A)(4).
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,103(3); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-A; WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.45.020(3). Acquisitions of nonprofit hospitals by other nonprofit
hospitals who maintain similar charitable purposes are exempt from the statute's regulation. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.020(3). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 109.34(A)(4).
GEN. LAWS

§ 23-17.14-4 (6).

142. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40:2115.12 (1). The statute is also activated when
an acquisition results in a 50% ownership or controlling interest in a nonprofit
hospital.
143. See OHIO. REV. CODE ANN.§ 109.34(4).
144. See id. Wisconsin has a similar 20% threshold for conversion activation but

overall cumulative possession of a 50% ownership or control activates oversight.
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the governing body occurring through regular elections or the
filling of vacancies is excluded. 45
Georgia has a more liberal threshold-fifty percent or a lesser
amount if, when combined with one or more transfers between
the same or related parties occurring within a five-year period,
constitutes a purchase or lease of at least.fifty percent of a nonprofit's assets. 46
The remaining states take a less exacting qualitative approach.
Maryland and Arizona require a substantial or significant disposal of a nonprofit health entity's assets for their threshold. 4 7
Arizona also includes a monetary threshold of at least one million dollars of book value of a nonprofit's assets. 48 The District
of Columbia's and California's criterion is a "material
' while Virginia and Maryland require the disposition
amount, 149
of all or substantially all of the nonprofit hospital's assets. 5 ° Oregon and Connecticut employ the terms "significant"'' and
"material,"152 respectively, in lieu of material or substantial.
Qualitative terms such as "material," "significant" or "substantial" are unnecessarily vague. The difficulty with using a
monetary threshold based upon book value is that depreciated
book values may bear no relationship to the assets' fair market
value. A qualitative threshold will invite challenges to the statute's application and will divert the focus from protecting charitable assets to defining the scope of the legislation. The need to
protect the public's interest in charitable assets and to preserve
continued access to affordable health in the affected community
mandates a lower-end quantitative threshold, as adopted by
Ohio and Wisconsin. Considering the overall value of an average nonprofit hospital's infrastructure, the conversion of twenty
percent of a nonprofit hospital's assets is almost certain to alter
145.
146.
147.

See N.H. REV. STAT. § 7:19-b(I)(a).
See GA. CODE ANN.§ 31-7-400(2)(A), (B).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 6.5-101.(b)(1);

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-

2592(A). Arizona also regulates acquisitions by nonprofit entities that are not part of
a common line of ownership, but excludes transactions that are used to refinance
assets already owned by the party. See id. at § 10-2592(C)(2), (3).
148. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 10-2592 (C)(1).
149. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-552(3); CAL. CORP.CODE § 5914(a)(1). The California statute does not apply if the agreement or transaction is in the usual and regular course of the hospital's activities or if the attorney general provides the
corporation a written waiver of review for the proposed agreement or transaction.
See id. at § 5914(c).
150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-531.

151.

See

152.

See 1997

OR. REv. STAT.
CONN.

§ 65.803(1)(a).

Acrs 188, § 2A.
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the nature of the services historically provided by the nonprofit
institution. Although a change in the nature of a nonprofit's
governance is less quantifiable, the conversion of twenty percent
of a nonprofit hospital's assets is likely to affect control or governance of that institution by introducing a new entity with
profit motivations and substantial voting power.
To be most effective, conversion statutes need to include a
provision, similar to Ohio's, regulating the cumulative purchases
of related entities within a five-year period. Cumulative thresholds will avoid systematically timed purchases.
2.

Notice, Public Disclosure and Approval
(a) Notice

Like the Model Act, most states require that notice of the
transaction be provided to the state's attorney general. 153 A minority of states require notice of the transaction to be given to
the attorney general and one or more other state agencies. Arizona, Nebraska and Rhode Island require that notice be given
to the attorney general and the Department of Health and
Human Services. 54 Arizona also requires that notice be given
to the Corporation Commission. Connecticut directs that notice
be given to the attorney general and the Commission of Health
Care Access. 155 Finally, New Hampshire requires that notice be
given to the attorney general and the Director of Charitable
56

Trust.1

Although the attorney general should maintain primary responsibility for approving conversion transactions, requiring the
transacting parties to provide notice to health departments and
charitable trust agencies is an excellent method to foster a multidisciplinary approach to evaluating the probable effects of a
153. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913; COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-19-103(1); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-7-401; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.13(A)(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 109.34(B); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.803(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-532. The District of
Columbia requires that notice be given to the Health Planning and Development
Agency, which is responsible for forwarding the notice to Corporation Counsel, the
equivalent of the state's attorney general. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-552(1), 32-553.
South Dakota requires notice to be given to the Secretary of State. See S.D. CODI-

§ 47-24-17.
154. See NEB. REV.

FIED LAws

STAT.

§ 71-20,103; R.I.

GEN. LAws

§ 23-17.14-5. Washington

requires that notice be sent to the Department of Health, which is charged with the
responsibility of forwarding the notice to the attorney general. See WASH. REV.
CODE

155.

§ 70.45.030(1).
See 1997

156. See N.H.

CONN. Acrs 188, § 2(A).
REV. STAT. § 7:19-b(III).
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conversion transaction. These agencies possess specialized expertise that can expedite the evaluation of the multiple issues
involved in conversion activity. While the attorney general may
be best suited to determine whether fair value will be received
for charitable assets, the Department of Health is likely to be
more experienced in evaluating concerns about access to and
quality of health care. The Departments of Corporations and
Revenue and the Director of Charitable Trusts are likely to have
greater expertise in monitoring and safeguarding the subsequent
use of conversion proceeds. An integrated approach to evaluating conversions will also provide consistency in the state's approach to nonprofit hospital conversions.
The substance of the notice requirements varies from the submission of the actual transaction documents to the mere notice
of the intention to purchase nonprofit hospital assets. Eight
states require detailed applications that include the actual transaction documents. 57 Five states require only a general summary
of the transaction documents.158 The District of Columbia and
the documentation that must be inCalifornia do not specify
59
cluded in the notice.
A number of states require the submission of expert reports
and certain business records in addition to transaction documents as part of the notice application. Five states require a
fairness evaluation by an independent expert to be included in
the parties' notice application. 60 Georgia requires that the nonprofit entity submit its by-laws, articles of incorporation and any
donative documents for gifts of $100,000 or more. 16 1 Maryland
requires that a financial and community impact analysis conducted by an independent expert be included in the notice. 62
See 1997 CONN. AcTs 188, § 2(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-402; HAW. REV.
§ 323D-B(B), (C); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. LEGIS. § 6.5-201(b); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-20.104; N.H. REV. STAT. § 7:19-b(III); WASH. REV. CODE
157.

STAT.,

§ 70.45.030(2); Wis. STAT. § 2-165(3).
158. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593(A)(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2115.13(B)(2) (the summaries are public records); OHIO REV. CODE § 109.34(B);
OR. REV. STAT. § 65.805(1) (the summaries are not public records, but the attorney
general has the authority to determine what documents will become public records);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6 (the detailed descriptions of the documents are public
records).
159. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5914(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553.
160. See 1997 CONN. AcTs 188, § 2-(b)(5); GA. CODE Ann. § 31-7-402(a); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.13(B)(2)(vi); OHIo REV. CODE § 109.34(c)(1); Wis. STAT.
§ 2-165.40(3)(6).

161.

See

GA. CODE ANN.

162.

See

MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T.
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New Hampshire requires that all compensation that is to be paid
as part of the transaction be disclosed along with the minutes
from the board of director's meeting approving the
transaction. 63
All of the above special requirements provide critical information necessary for state officials to evaluate the major effects
of conversion and important for the community to understand
the effects of the conversion. Thus, such requirements should be
included in all conversion legislation to maximize the protection
of the public's interest in charitable assets and to preserve continued access to affordable health care. The completeness of the
notice is directly correlated to the protection afforded the
public.
The timetable for disclosure prior to the completion of the
transaction varies considerably among the states with no clear
trends in development. Wisconsin requires notice thirty days
before an offer to purchase or lease is made. 164 Virginia requires
notice sixty days before the parties complete the transaction. 65
Arizona and Georgia require the notice to be filed ninety66days
before the parties' anticipated closing of the transaction.
Other states provide a timetable for the attorney general's
consideration of the transaction following notice. In Connecticut, the attorney general has twenty days from receipt of notice
to determine if the transaction involves a material amount of
assets. 67 Hawaii and Nebraska provide that the attorney general must determine 68
if review is appropriate within twenty days
of receipt of notice.
A number of states require that the attorney general determine if the application is complete within a specific timetable.
Louisiana and Washington provide that the attorney general determine 16 9if the application is complete within fifteen days of
receipt.

163.
164.

See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(III).
See Wis. STAT. § 165.40(2)(b).
165. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-532.
166. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593(A); GA. CODE ANN.§ 31-7-401 (requiring
that the notice be filed by both parties to the transaction).
167. See 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 3(a).
168. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-C(B); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20.105(2).
169. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.14(B)(1); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.040(1).
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Public Notice

Most states require publication of the notice and at least one
public hearing to receive public comment and to take testimony.
Five states require the attorney general to publish notice of the
transaction within five days of the receipt of an application in a
paper of general circulation in the area where the nonprofit hospital is located. 170 Five states require notice to be published
within ten days.1 71 Rhode Island also requires that the initial
notice publication include the scheduled date for public hearing
on the conversion. 72 New Hampshire does not include a spe73
cific timetable for the publication of the notice.
Considering the administrative limitations of most government offices, it is crucial not to streamline the review process to
the point that short review periods affect the attorney general's
substantive oversight. While there is a range of reasonableness
as it relates to notice publication, the ultimate goal is to provide
the attorney general and the public with sufficient notice of the
transaction so that the community groups and other interested
persons have sufficient time to study the transaction details and
to formulate alternative strategies. Yet, unnecessarily extended
notice periods can be counter-productive and frustrate appropriate health care consolidations. A balanced approach should be
employed to facilitate an expedient but thorough approval
process.
An attorney general should be in a position to disclose
whether the application is complete within a fifteen-day period.
Once the application is complete, public notice of the transaction at least forty-five days prior to conducting a public hearing
should be sufficient time for interested community groups to
evaluate the terms of the transaction and explore alternatives to
conversion. That same forty-five day period should provide ample time for other health care entities to formulate competitive
bids.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20.105(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.040(2); Wis.
§ 165.40(3)(c); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-C(A); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2115.14A(1). Ohio requires the nonprofit entity to publish the notice within
seven days of submitting an application. See OHio REV. CODE § 109.34(F).
171. See 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 2(C); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-404; MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 6.5-202(A); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(b)(1); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-532.
172. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-7(b)(1)(c).
173. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(IV).
170.

STAT.
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(c)

Public Disclosure

The public's access to the submitted conversion application
and supporting documents varies considerably among the states.
Wisconsin provides that the application and all supporting documents are public documents. 74 Maryland provides that the sub1 75
missions are public documents unless deemed confidential.
Oregon and Rhode Island provide that public disclosure of the
notice documentation is left to the discretion of the attorney
general. 176 South Dakota's statute is a notice only legislation
and does not require either public disclosure or public
hearings. 77
While complete disclosure is always preferred, the primary
goals of reviewing conversion transactions should be: (1) to insure that fair value is paid for charitable assets and (2) to establish an ongoing and effective system to regulate and monitor the
subsequent use of conversion proceeds. These goals can be best
achieved with Rhode Island's balanced approach of preserving
the public's right to disclosure with the transacting parties' need
to protect trade secrets and other confidential information.
Rhode Island places the burden on the contracting parties to
identify and then to establish the basis of any confidentiality
claim. 178 Absent the assertion that particular documents or
schedules should be privileged, all submissions should be public
documents.
While most states that have enacted conversion legislation require a public hearing to consider the propriety of the intended
conversion, there is no consistent timetable for conducting hearings. Colorado, Louisiana and Nebraska require a hearing to be
held within thirty days of a completed application. 79 California
and Connecticut require one or more hearings but provide no
specific scheduling timetable.8 s Washington requires the hearings to be completed within forty-five days of the receipt of the
conversion application and upon ten days prior notice.'18 Ore174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Wis. STAT. § 165.40(3)(b).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-201(c).
OR. REv. STAT. § 65.805(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6(33)(C).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-24-17.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6(33)(C).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-19-404(1); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.15(A);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-20.106 (specifically requiring that 10 days prior notice be given
for the hearing date).
180. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5916; 1997 CONN. ACrs 188, § 6.
181. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.050.
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gon simply requires the hearings to be held upon fourteen days
notice. 82 Wisconsin provides two timetables: (1) if the transaction involves a single hospital, a hearing must be completed
within thirty days; but (2) if the transaction involves a hospital
system, a hearing must be held within 120 days. 183 Hawaii and
184
the District of Columbia provide for discretionary hearings.
Finally, the Virginia and South Dakota statutes do not provide
185
for public hearings.
Again, the specific scheduling date should be the result of
compromise. It should balance the public's need for a sufficient
time to evaluate the transaction and the transacting parties'
need for closure. Unnecessarily protracted reviews merely increase costs without adding value to the review process. A public hearing conducted upon forty-five days public notice
following the filing of a completed application should provide
the attorney general and the public with sufficient time to prepare. A second public notice, fourteen days prior to the public
hearing date published in a paper of general circulation in the
affected community and in the principal places of business of the
contracting parties, should be adequate to protect the public.
The majority of states give the reviewing entity discretion to
determine the appropriate scope of its review. Eight states allow the reviewing body to request additional information, issue
subpoenas, take sworn statements and conduct depositions
as part of the required public hearings. 186 Nine states allow
the attorney general to retain independent experts at the par1 87
ties' expense to evaluate the propriety of the transactions.
182. See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.807(1).
183. See Wis. STAT. § 165.40(3)(d).
184. See D.C. CODE ANN. 1981 § 32-556(b) (The District of Columbia does not
provide a timetable for discretionary hearings); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-D (Hawaii
requires that if a hearing is conducted that it be completed within 60 days of notice of
the application).
185. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-24-17; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-532 (requiring public notice of pending transaction in the local newspaper)..
186. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-556; HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-D(A); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-203(A)(2)(D); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,106; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-17.14-14; WIS. STAT. § 165.40(3)(F); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.050; 1997
CONN. Acrs § 4(b).

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5919(a)(1); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-556(c); GA. CODE
§ 31-7-405(b); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-20,108(5); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:19-

187.
ANN.

b(IV) (limiting the retention of experts to the transactions involving assets in excess
of $5 million); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(c); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.813; R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-13; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-532.
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None of the statutes limit the scope of expert's evaluations. 88
There has been no reported judicial decision examining the
scope, weight or use of expert reports in the approval process.
The attorney general's discretion as to the use of experts should
extend to the scope of his undertaking. Depending on the expertise of the attorney general's office and the involvement of
other states agencies, the use of experts should include: (1) determining whether fair value will be received for the nonprofit
assets; (2) evaluating the transaction's likely effect on the community's access to affordable quality health care; and (3) verifying that post-transaction use of the conversion proceeds will be
consistent with the original mission of the nonprofit hospital.
(d) Approval
A clear majority of states that have adopted conversion legislation require that the reviewing entity approve the transaction
before the parties may complete the transaction. 189 A few of
these states provide that inaction on the part of the attorney
general beyond the approval period confers approval. 190 By
contrast, four states have passed conversion legislation that does
not require the reviewing entity to approve the transaction.' 9'
Colorado takes a middle road and gives the 92
attorney general
authority to file suit to enjoin the conversion.1
188. Arguably, an expert's analysis could include: (1) evaluating the sales price to
determine if the nonprofit is receiving fair value for its assets; (2) checking for conflicts of interest to determine if private benefit or private inurement would result from
the transaction; (3) conducting access to care studies to determine if the transaction
would result in the denial of medical care to the uninsured or underinsured; and (4)
appropriate needs analysis to evaluate the intended or disclosed use of the sales
proceeds.
189. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5914; 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 3 (requiring approval
if the attorney general determines the transaction involves a material amount of assets); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(a); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-B; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:2115.11; MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 6.5-102; NEB. REV. STAT. § 7120,107(1); N.H. REV, STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(IV); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.34(B);
OR. REV. STAT. § 65.803(1); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17.14-5; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.030; WIS. STAT. § 165.40(2)(a).
190. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-E(B); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,107(1); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(IV).

191. Arizona and Georgia require that a report of the public hearing be prepared,
which may provide formal disclosure, but lack any approval requirement. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. AN. § 10.2593; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-401. South Dakota and Virginia
have no hearing or approval requirements. See S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 47-24-17; VA.
CODE ANN.

192.

§ 55-532.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-19-103(2).
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Conversion legislation that simply requires disclosure of the
intent to convert charitable assets or the preparation of a report
on the public hearing elevates form over substance. Notice-only
conversion statutes do not protect charitable assets, because
they do not require the payment of fair value for charitable assets or establish an ongoing and effective system to regulate and
monitor the subsequent use of the conversion proceeds. Explicit approval mechanisms are essential to effective conversion
legislation.
Conferring approval upon inaction is also potentially dangerous. Although state agencies strive for punctuality, they have
limited resources, and inadvertent delays occur. Timetables
should never substitute for substantive approval. To insure the
public and parties have been adequately informed, the attorney
general should be required to issue not only a decision but the
basis for that decision before the conversion is allowed to proceed. From the parties' perspective, requiring formal written
decisions from the attorney general will facilitate judicial review.
3.
(a)

Valuation

DeterminingFair Market Value for Nonprofit
Hospital Assets

Except for the few states with notice-only statutes, 93 the remaining states have enacted provisions attempting to establish
mechanisms for assuring that the sale of nonprofit hospital assets results in the purchaser paying fair market value for nonprofit hospital assets. 194 Although state legislation does not and
realistically could not require a particular method or formula for
calculating specific values for charitable assets, most states attempt to provide the reviewing entities with sufficient discretion
so that a reasonable review of the transaction can be completed
in a timely fashion. The true challenge of conversion legislation
is evaluating unique enterprises. The attorney general is called
upon to quantify a nonprofit hospital's market share, payor mix,
managed care contracts, sophisticated equipment, goodwill and
193.

See S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS

§ 47-24-17;

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 55-532.

194. Fair market value is defined as "the amount at which property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts ... " or
"the price at which bona fide sales have been consummated for assets of like type,
quality, and quantity in a particular market at the time of acquisition." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

537 (5th ed. 1979).
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"strategic position" in a rapidly changing health care market. 195
The attorney general's tenacity is as crucial as the specific authority bestowed.
The most common provision found is the requirement that the
attorney general determine whether the nonprofit hospital is receiving fair market value for its assets. 196 Seven states require
that the application include or reflect that an independent expert's fairness evaluation was utilized in determining appropriate evaluations. 97 Hawaii merely requires the attorney general
to consider, when evaluating the transaction, whether the seller
used an independent expert to determine the fair value of its
charitable assets. 198 Five states require the specific determination that the nonprofit hospital's assets were not manipulated to
decrease their value to facilitate the sale. 199
Except for the notice-only statutes, existing conversion legislation adequately authorizes the attorney general to determine
whether fair market value has been received for a nonprofit's
assets. Although such a determination is crucial to protecting
the public, solely focusing on this calculation could result in unintended consequences. The determination of the actual fair
market value of the nonprofit hospital's assets should be the
starting point of the evaluation, not its conclusion. The goal
should be to achieve a fair value, but not necessarily the highest
value, after careful consideration of all aspects of the conversion
transaction. 2o
195.
196.

See Miller, supra note 2, § 3, at 5.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(c); 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 4(a)(4); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-553(c)(9); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(6); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-F(5)
(requiring reasonably fair value); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.17(B)(4) (requiring
fair value); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T. § 6.5-301(D); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7120,108(5) (requiring fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(B)(2); OR. REV.
STAT. § 65.811(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(17); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.070(5).
197. See 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 4(a)(2)(C); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(c)(3); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(4) (requiring that the seller retain an independent expert to
complete a fairness evaluation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(5); OHIO REV. CODE

§ 109.35(B)(2) (placing an affirmative duty on the parties to update the attorney
general with information that may affect the ultimate valuation of the nonprofit assets); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.070(5); Wis. STAT. § 165.40(F).
198. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-F(3).
199. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(d); 1997 CONN. ACTS 188, § 4(a)(5); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-553(c)(9); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-403(4); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2317.14-7(23).
ANN.

200.

Rhode Island's legislation provides the most comprehensive criteria for eval-

uating the propriety of conversion applications. It enumerates an exhaustive checklist
that if followed will result in the most comprehensive review of conversion activity. Its
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The highest value does not always represent the best alternative when selling health care assets. Rather, the continued delivery of health care services may be the highest priority.
Nonprofit hospitals should properly consider, in addition to the
bid amount, the purchaser's "managed care network presence in
the community, corporate culture, reputation for providing
quality care, and access to capital" in accepting a particular offer
from a for-profit company.20 1 The purchase price should reflect
the fair market value of the assets sold and the contractual commitments of the purchaser to maintain minimal levels-above
those mandated by existing state and federal law-of quality
health care to the indigent in the affected community. Securing
commitments from the purchaser to continue medical services
that are not profitable or that target indigent populations may
require an adjustment in the purchase price.
(b)

Placing CharitableAssets at Risk

When the purchase price is not paid in cash at the time of the
conversion, important questions concerning the nature of the
charitable assets arise: (1) are charitable assets being placed at
unreasonable risk; and (2) are the charitable assets still considered in the charitable stream or are they accruing to the benefit
of private individuals? 20 2 Seven states require the reviewing entity to determine whether charitable assets will be placed at unreasonable risk due to financing arrangements or joint
ventures.20 3 Georgia requires the parties to disclose at public
hearing whether the nonprofit hospital is providing any financing for the transaction. 20 4 The District of Columbia's statute is
more comprehensive, requiring the reviewing entity to specifically determine that the buyer is financially sound and has the
management expertise to operate the health care entity. 20 5
Safeguarding charitable assets requires that financing arrangements are carefully scrutinized and closely monitored. The
thoroughness is a tribute to the state-for it recognizes not only the complexity but
also the importance of the issues raised when nonprofit hospitals convert to for-profit.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7.
201. GAO Report, supra note 10, at 13.
202. See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 3.
203. See 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 4(6); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(10); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.17(B)(5); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-302(E)(7);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(6); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.070(6); Wis. STAT.

§ 165.40(4)(e).
204. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(7).
205. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(6).
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value of the purchase price can be greatly affected by the purchaser's financial security. Nonprofit conversion should be evaluated like any other business transaction. If the purchaser
cannot demonstrate sufficient financial stability, the conversion
should be disapproved.
(c)

Conflicts of Interest

Though some argue that the only plausible method to ensure
that conflicts of interest do not arise from the sale of nonprofit
assets is to ban conversion, a prohibition would inhibit necessary
consolidation as part of continued health care reform. Market
conditions, over-supply of hospital beds in certain regions, and
the economies of scale point toward continued consolidation as
one method of stemming the rising cost of health care. The only
prudent solution is to closely monitor and to require disclosure
of potential conflicts of interest.
Seven states require that the parties disclose conflicts of interest.20 6 New Hampshire requires that the seller also certify that it
has acted in good faith and consistent with its fiduciary duties.20 7
Three states require that the parties disclose whether any health
care providers were provided the opportunity to invest in the
transaction.0 8 While the majority of the states require the attorney general to specifically determine whether the management
contracts are fair,20 9 Rhode Island requires disclosure of salary
and severance provided to officers, directors and board members.210 California imposes stricter controls on conflicts of interest by prohibiting board members from receiving compensation
from the purchaser for a period of two years following the
transaction.21 '
206. See 1997 CONN. Acr 188, § 4(a)(3); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(7); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 323D-76(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.17(B)(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7120,108(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(II); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 109.34(B)(3)
(requiring disclosure of all contracts and agreements between the parties and their
officers, directors and other fiduciaries); Wis. STAT. § 165.40(4)(d).
207. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(III).
208. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(13); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,109(3); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-11(4).
209. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(11); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(8); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 323D-76(7); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2115.17(B)(6); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-301(E)(8); NEaB. REv. STAT. § 71-20,108(7); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2317.14-7(14); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.070(7).
210. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6(23).
211. See Bill Banning Officer Compensation from Nonprofit Conversions Signed
by Wilson, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Oct. 23, 1997, at 1632.
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A complete prohibition against board members receiving
compensation post-acquisition may impede necessary conversions. Even where a nonprofit hospital is inviable, self-interest
on the part of board members may frustrate an otherwise appropriate conversion. Full disclosure of management contracts,
board compensation and ownership interests will allow the attorney general to determine if the purchase price represents fair
value for the assets sold. It will also permit the attorney general
to determine whether private inurement or private benefit will
likely result from the transaction and thereby jeopardize the
nonprofit entity's federal tax-exempt status.212
(d)

Inurement and Private Benefit Issues

Only three states require that the attorney general make a
specific determination that no inurement or private benefit will
result from the transaction.2 13 This is a critical element in determining whether conflicts of interest exist. Providing any amount
of remuneration above reasonable value for services rendered
improperly siphons away charitable assets that should be devoted to the continued provision of health care services in the
affected community. To protect the nonprofit's tax status, all
conversion legislation should require that inurement and private
benefit issues be carefully evaluated.214
(e)

Due Diligence

The overwhelming majority of states require the parties to
demonstrate either in written summaries or during public hearing that due diligence was used in selecting the buyer, evaluating
alternatives and negotiating the terms of the agreement. 215 Nebraska, Rhode Island and Washington require that the review212. See infra at Section III, Federal Avenues of Conversion Scrutiny, for a discussion of private inurement and private benefit issues.
213. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(b); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-

301(B)(3);

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 65.811(2).

214. Rhode Island requires a determination that the transaction will not jeopardize the tax status of the seller. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(21).
215. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593(F)(4); 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 4(2); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-553(c)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-

17.14-7 (c)(2); N.H.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(II)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(2);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-F(2); Wis. STAT. § 165.40(4)(b); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.070(2); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-302(E)(IV); COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 6-19-403(1)(d).
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ing entity make this determination.216 New Hampshire requires
a determination that the transaction is in the best interest of the
charitable trust,217 while Georgia requires that it be consistent
with the intent of the donors.218 A thorough due diligence analysis should be the starting point of all conversion reviews.
4.

Community Impact Assessment and Access to
Care Provisions

The majority of states require the attorney general to consider
whether the conversion is likely to cause a significant disruption
in the affected community's access to affordable health care
services. 219 However, most of the legislation does not mandate
that the transaction be disapproved upon an affirmative finding
of disruption. 220 Five states require that the reviewing entity determine if the affected community is assured continued access to
affordable health care and whether the purchaser is committed
to providing care to the affected community's underinsured and
uninsured residents. 221 California and Oregon merely require a
determination of whether the transaction will significantly affect
the availability of or access to health care services in the affected
community.22 2 Arizona requires that the parties submit at the
public hearing a written report, detailing whether the transacadverse reaction on access, availability
tion is likely to have an
223
or cost of health care.
216. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(c)(2);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.070(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.17(B); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-203(E)(IV).
217. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 7:19-b(II)(b).
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(2).

See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 10-2593(F)(2)-(3); 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 5(b); GA.
§ 31-7-406(11); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-8(b)(2); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7:19-b(III); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,109; HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-77(1);
WASH REv. CODE § 70.45.080; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.18; MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-301(E)(7); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.811; COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-19403(1)(b).
220. See id.
221. See ARIZ. REV. STAT § 10-2593(F)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115-18(2);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 371-20,109(2); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-77(2); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.45.080.
222. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(h); OR. REV. STAT. § 65-811(7). Colorado's
attorney general may consider if the transaction will result in continuing access to
care, but lacks approval or disapproval authority. The attorney general's only option
is to seek redress in the circuit court. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-19403(1)(b), 6-19-402, and 6-19-103.
223. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593 (F).
219.

CODE ANN.
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Georgia takes a different approach and requires the seller to
certify, and to disclose during the public hearing, whether sufficient safeguards are in place to assure the public that the transaction will not adversely affect the availability and accessibility
of health care services.224 Georgia also requires the buyer to
disclose whether it has negotiated enforceable commitments for
to the disadvantaged,
the continuation of health care services 225
underinsured and uninsured community.
Rather than relying upon undefined commitments, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Rhode Island attempt to quantify
the minimum level of indigent care required to be provided by
the purchaser. In the District of Columbia, the parties must certify that for five years following the transaction, the percentage
of bad debt and charity care will be equal to or greater than the
average amount for the two years before the transaction.226
Rhode Island requires the "new" hospital to include in its transaction documents the level of the community benefit and charity
care it intends to provide for a five-year period after the transaction.227 Before the purchaser can eliminate or significantly reduce emergency room or primary care services, it must apply for
approval from the Department of Health.228
Requiring the parties to disclose the specific level of care expected from the purchaser in the conversion documents will enhance the attorney general's effectiveness in enforcing
contractual commitments following the transaction. Forcing the
purchaser to seek court approval before eliminating or significantly reducing crucial health care services to the affected community is an effective system to monitor and control posttransaction activities. Detailed disclosures will facilitate posttransaction enforcement of the parties' contractual obligations
and commitments.
224. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-403(b)(8). Maryland has a similar concept requiring the attorney general, when determining whether the transaction is in the public's interest, to consider whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the
affected community will have continued access to care. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T. § 6.5-301(E)(7).
225. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-406(12).
226. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-356(b)(2)(A).
227. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6(a)(21). Hawaii requires the reviewing entity
to consider whether the purchaser has committed to providing the similar level of
health care services previously provided by the nonprofit hospital to the affected community. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-77(2).
228. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-18; HAw. REV. STAT. § 323D-82(a).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/3

42

Donohue: Crossroads in Hospital Conversions - A Survey of Nonprofit Hospit

Crossroads in Hospital Conversions

1999]
5.

Enforcement/Monitoring and Remedies/Penalties

Overall, current state enactments do not sufficiently emphasize the enforcement and monitoring of post-conversion activities. Often enforcement provisions are entirely absent or are
inadequate to establish a procedure to systematically monitor
the parties' post-transaction activities.
(a)

Enforcement of ContractualObligations

Approximately half of the states enacting legislation failed to
include provisions specifically providing for the enforcement of
the parties' contractual obligations. 229 Six states provide that
hospital licensure should be refused or revoked if a transaction
is completed without proper approval. 230 Six states include general provisions authorizing the enforcement of the statute
through judicial proceedings. 23 '
In Colorado and Washington, if the attorney general receives
information that the parties are not properly fulfilling their
transaction obligations, he may institute proceedings in the district court to require corrective action.232 In Hawaii, if the State
Health Planning and Development Agency receives information
that the acquiring entity is not fulfilling its commitments to the
affected community, it may institute proceedings to revoke the
license issued to the purchaser.233 Louisiana and Nebraska provide that if the buyer is not in compliance with transaction covenants, the attorney general may petition to have the hospital's
operating license revoked.234 Rhode Island requires that all hospitals meet minimum requirements for charity and uncompensated care as a condition of continued licensing, but the statute
does not include a provision that would grant the reviewing
entity authority to enforce the parties' other contractual
undertakings.235
229. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593; CAL. CORP. CODE § 5915; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7:19-b; OR. REV. STAT. § 65.815; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-30; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-24-17; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-532; Wis. STAT. § 165.40(6).
230. See 1997 CONN. AcTs 188, § 8; D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-355; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-7-408; HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-80; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.20; MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-305; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-30
231. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(G)(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-19407(3); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.45.90; D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-559; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-20,110; GA. CODE ANN. § 317-407.
232. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-19-407; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.100.
233. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 323 D-H.
234. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.20; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,110.
235. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-15.
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Monitoring Compliance

Monitoring the parties' post-transaction activities is an indispensable element of enforcement. Yet only three states, Louisiana, Colorado and Washington, have established reasonable
mechanisms to monitor and evaluate compliance with transaction covenants. Colorado and Washington require that the
buyer and seller submit periodic reports demonstrating compliance with transaction covenants. 36 The reviewing entity may
also subpoena information and conduct on-site compliance audits. Upon information that the parties are not in compliance,
the reviewing entity may conduct a hearing and, if appropriate,
secure corrective action.237 Thereafter, the reviewing entity may
suspend or revoke the hospital's license or proceed with judicial
proceedings to compel compliance. 2 8 Louisiana's attorney general may require annual reports from the buyer and seller for up
to five years to ensure compliance with transaction covenants.239
Maryland only requires the charitable entity that receives conversion proceeds to submit an annual report detailing its grant
making and other charitable activities.240
To be effective, conversion legislation needs to empower the
attorney general with authority to require strict performance of
contractual obligations by the corporate entities and to impose
civil monetary penalties against the individual corporate officers
and directors for circumventing those obligations. All conversion legislation should include both explicit enforcement authority and mechanisms to determine whether community
obligations have been met. Conversion statutes should include
mandatory annual reports for a minimum of five years following
conversion. During this period, the parties should be required
to demonstrate compliance with all contractual obligations.
Legislation should provide for an automatic license revocation
for the failure to file required annual reports. The attorney general should have discretion to extend the reporting requirements
to the point at which all transactional commitments have been
satisfied.

236. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-19-405; WASH. REV.
237. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-19-405; WASH. REV.
238. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-19-405; WASH. REV.
239. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.19.
240. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-306(B).
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To augment state oversight of post-transaction activities, conversion legislation should also include qui tam provisions.241
These provisions would allow individuals and community groups
to bring suit on behalf of the attorney general in the event the
purchaser fails to honor its transaction commitments. Providing
standing to community watch groups and employees is an inexpensive and effective system to supplement attorney general
supervision.
(c)

Remedies and Penalties

States have given insufficient attention to remedy and penalty
provisions. Seven states contain no penalty provisions for violating provisions of the conversion statute.242 While the attorney
general may be able to enforce certain specific transaction obligations under his inherent common law authority, 243 research
reveals no reported judicial decisions in which any reviewing authority attempted to enforce transactional obligations arising
out of hospital conversion legislation. The absence of specific
remedies and penalties suggests a lack of commitment on the
part of states to monitor post-transaction activities. The lack of
resolve to rigorously enforce conversion legislation may raise
uncertainty among state officers as to the extent of their enforcement authority and signal to the transacting parties that
post-conversion oversight will be lax.
Only Connecticut and Georgia provide that any agreement
without approval is void. 24 Washington authorizes its attorney
general to refuse the filing of any transaction documents entered
into without the requisite approval.245 Although the majority of
states provide for the revocation or denial of a license to operate
a hospital following an unauthorized conversion,246 too few of
the enactments impose significant monetary penalties against
the parties and their officers and directors for violation of notice, disclosure and approval requirements. Because the denial
241.

For a definition of this term see supra note 124.

242. See ARiz.
STAT.

§ 6-19-407;

REV. STAT.

§ 10-2593;

NEB. REV. STAT.

CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 71-20,111;

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 5917;

COLO. REV.
§ 65.809; S.D. CODI-

§ 47-24-17; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-533.
243. For a definition of these terms see supra notes 43, 44.
244. See 1997 CONN. AcTs 188, § (2)(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-412.
245. See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.090(1).
246. See 1997 CONN. AcTs 188, § 8; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-412; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 323D-80(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.20; MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T.
§ 6.5-305; NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-20,112; N.H. REv. STAT. § 7:19-b(V); WASH. REv.
CODE. § 70.45.100; WIs. STAT. § 165.40(6)(a).

FIED LAWS ANN.
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or revocation of a hospital's license denies the community access
to health care, enforcement provisions must include monetary
penalties as an alternative to hospital closure. Significant monetary penalties that can be readily assessed against the corporate
entities and their officers and directors without disrupting access
to health care would be an effective deterrent to unauthorized
conversions.
The District of Columbia has a more realistic approach to enforcement. There, the corporation counsel may enjoin any person or party from offering, developing or operating a hospital
without notice to and approval of corporation counsel.247 Corporation counsel may also impose daily fines from $2,500 to
$10,000 for each day an unauthorized activity continues and
against any party convicted of violating its transaction
covenants. 48
New Hampshire authorizes the Director of Charitable Trusts
to bring judicial proceedings to enjoin or void a conversion
transaction that occurs without proper notice or with deceptive
or materially inaccurate notice.249 Ohio employs similar language but also authorizes the attorney general to assess a monetary penalty not to exceed $10,000,000 for any transaction
occurring without appropriate approval.2 5 0 Georgia provides for
the imposition of fines against the individual board members
and the chief executive officer, up to $50,000 and imprisonment
for up to one year for completing a conversion in violation of
the statute.25 '
Rhode Island authorizes its attorney general to refuse to issue, suspend or revoke, a hospital's license if a person is found
guilty of knowingly or fraudulently giving false information during the approval process or failing to comply with statutory requirements.252 In addition, the superior court may impose fines
of up to $1,000,000 or five years imprisonment. 3 In Ohio, if a
board member, director, officer or other fiduciary is convicted
of entering into a transaction without approval, it is considered a
third degree felony.254
247.

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-559.

248. See id.

249.

See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(V).

250.
251.

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(G)(3).
See GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-7-412.

252.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-30.

253.
254.

See id.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.99(D).
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Effective penalties and remedy provisions must not only include the authority to void the transaction and revoke hospital
licenses, but also provide for significant monetary penalties to
be asserted against the entities and their officers and directors
for failure to satisfy conversion requirements. Since the affected
community's need for continued access to health care makes
hospital closure imprudent, fines up to $10,000,000 against the
contracting entities and $1,000,000 against the entities' officers
and directors should provide a sufficient deterrent to unauthorized conversions. For the failure to satisfy conversion commitments or for the misuse of conversion proceeds, daily fines
should be imposed. An alternative to establishing a specific
daily fine, such as $10,000 per day, per occurrence, would be to
establish fines in proportion to the value of the commitments
broken and charitable funds misappropriated. It is also imperative that post-transaction penalties allow for the assessment of
personal liability against the parties' officers and directors for
the failure to meet contractual obligations and for the misuse of
conversion proceeds.
6. Restrictions on Subsequent Use and Disposition of
Charitable Assets
The failure to institute strict restrictions on the use of conversion proceeds and to require the ongoing monitoring of grantmaking activities supported by conversion proceeds is the greatest shortfall of current state conversion legislation. With minor
exceptions, the current enactments are woefully inadequate to
protect the staggering amount of converted charitable assets.
(a)

Control of Conversion Proceeds

Only a few states regulate or control the use of conversion
proceeds. Four states simply require the reviewing entity to
consider, as part of the approval process, whether control of
conversion proceeds will be independent of the parties to the
transaction. 55 Connecticut and Colorado require that an
amount equal to the fair market value of the charitable assets be
255. See LA.
20,108(8); WASH.

REV.

STAT.

REV. CODE

ANN. § 40:2114.17(B)(7); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71§ 70.45.070(8); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-76(8). Colo-

rado requires that the parties set aside proceeds from the transaction in an amount
equal to the fair market value of the charitable assets and distribute them to a charitable organization independent of the parties and broadly representative of the affected.
community. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-9-403(e) to 6-9-403(f). New Hampshire has a
similar requirement, unless the seller is a New Hampshire charitable trust, in which
case it can retain the sales proceeds. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(II)(f).
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transferred to an organization selected by the superior court and
unaffiliated with the parties to the transaction.25 6 The District of
Columbia's corporation counsel has the authority to require that
conversion proceeds are placed in an appropriate charitable
trust.25 7 Ohio requires that the sales proceeds be dedicated and
transferred to one or more existing charitable organizations, or
if specifically authorized, to a charitable foundation. 8 Maryland requires that sixty percent of the fair market value of the
charitable assets of the nonprofit hospital be distributed to public or nonprofit charities dedicated to serving the unmet health
care needs of the affected community and to promoting access
to and quality of care.259
While directing conversion proceeds into an independent
foundation or charitable organization is a prudent first step, additional safeguards are necessary. To maintain the independence of these organizations, participation of the parties and
their affiliates on the boards of these charities should be limited
to twenty percent. To ensure that necessary health care services
are provided, the remaining board members should be broadly
representative of the affected community. To facilitate systematic oversight, a representative of the attorney general should be
an automatic appointment to a newly created board for a minimum five-year period.26 °
(b)

Limitations on the Subsequent Use of
Conversion Proceeds

Ten states simply require, without providing guidelines, that
the attorney general determine if the proposed use of the sales
proceeds is consistent with the nonprofit hospital's charitable
purpose.26 ' Virginia lacks any provisions regarding the subse256.
§ 4(8).
257.
258.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-9-403(e) to 6-9-403(f); 1997 CONN. AcTs 188,

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-554(a).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(F)(1).
259. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5.301(b)(2)(ii). Maryland provides
that before a charitable entity can receive conversion funds, it must establish a mechanism for avoiding conflicts of interest. See id.
260. See supra note 125.
261. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323D-76(8); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.17(B)(7); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20,108(8); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §7:19-b (II)(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.35(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 65.811(4);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.45.070(8). Ohio differs to the extent that the use of the proceeds must be consistent with the charitable trust to which it is subject. South Dakota
has a similar concept-it requires that the notice to the Secretary of State include an
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quent use of the sales proceeds. 62
Some states require the parties to state their intended posttransaction use of conversion proceeds. Arizona, Georgia and
Rhode Island require the original conversion proposal to disclose the intended use of the sale proceeds.263 Arizona also requires the parties to describe the resources that will remain in
the community and whether they will be deposited in a community benefit organization.2 64 Rhode Island requires the buyer to
include in its application a statement specifying the manner in
which it intends to fulfill the hospital's charitable objectives.265
Colorado mandates that the charitable mission and function of
the nonprofit organization receiving conversion funds reflect the
historical charitable purposes of the nonprofit entity proposing
the conversions.266
Connecticut and the District of Columbia restrict the use of
conversion proceeds to health care services broadly consistent
with the original purpose of the selling entity in the affected
community.267 Maryland's method of monitoring the activity of
the foundation is to require the charitable trust to submit annual
reports regarding its grant-making and other charitable
endeavors.268
Whether the conversion proceeds are administered by the existing nonprofit organization or are placed in a new foundation,
safeguards must ensure that the ongoing health care needs of
the affected community, especially the needs of the uninsured
and underinsured population, are met. To accomplish this, conversion legislation should require the entity receiving conversion
proceeds to conduct a "needs" analysis to determine the health
care services most needed by the affected community and to
submit a plan to meet these needs before conversion funds are
expended. Except for Maryland, Colorado, Washington and
Louisiana, there are no ongoing annual reporting requirements
explanation of how the transaction "furthers the purpose of the nonprofit corporation." See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-24-17(4).
262. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-531.
263. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-2593(F)(5); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-403(b)(7);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(c)(25).
264. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 10-2593(F)(1).
265. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-6(a)(21).
266. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-19-403(1)(i).
267. See 1997 CONN. Acrs 188, § 4(8)(B); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-553(c)(12).
268. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-306(b).
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placed upon the nonprofit health care institution mandating that
2 69
grant making be justified.
III.

FEDERAL AVENUES OF CONVERSION SCRUTINY
Conversion transactions are resulting in the largest redistribution of charitable assets in history.27 ° The sheer magnitude of
these funds requires a comprehensive state and federal strategy
to avoid the dilution and misappropriation of charitable assets.27 ' Yet, for the most part, individual states, not the federal
government, review and regulate nonprofit hospital conversion
activities. 2 72 Currently, there are no federal agencies that require notification of or regulate the conversion approval process. Federal scrutiny, if undertaken, most often occurs after
conversions have been completed and rarely focuses on health
care quality and access issues or on restricting the use of conversion proceeds.273 What supplemental federal oversight exists is
potentially available from two primary sources: (1) antitrust
screening by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission; and (2) Internal Revenue Service scrutiny stemming from tax-exempt operational requirements prohibiting private inurement and private benefit.
A. Antitrust Considerations
Although antitrust laws are not specifically directed toward
nonprofit hospital conversions, they are generally intended to
promote competition by limiting business activities that substantially lessen competition.274 As such, in order for conversion activity to activate federal antitrust scrutiny, the transaction would
need to result in a monopoly or the restraint of trade or commerce. 75 One federal health care official explained that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission oversee
nonprofit hospital conversions.276 However, since hospital conversions are viewed for antitrust purposes in the same manner
269. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-19-405; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2115.19;
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 6.5-306(b); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.45.100.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
U.S.C.
275.
276.

See Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 1.
See id. at 1, 2.
See Singer, supra note 14, at 224.
See Fishman, supra note 2, at 717; Miller, supra note 3, § 2, at 1.
See generally, Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); Clayton Act § 7, 15
§ 18 (1994).
See Sherman Act § 1; Clayton Act § 7.
See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 30. See also GAO Examines Nonprofit

Hospital Conversions, HEALTH LAW. NEWS, Feb. 1998, at 23.
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as other types of mergers and acquisitions involving two or more
nonprofit entities, they do not ordinarily violate antitrust
guidelines. 7
According to the GAO Report, since 1993 the FTC has
brought only three antitrust enforcement actions involving nonprofit hospital conversions.278 Unless a nonprofit hospital conversion creates an entity with a market share that impermissibly
reduces competition, it is unlikely that either the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission will review the transaction. Even where antitrust questions arise, the focus of these
agencies is to preserve competition rather than charitable assets.279 It is unlikely either of these entities is authorized to require that fair value is paid for charitable assets or that an
ongoing system to regulate and monitor the use of conversion
proceeds is established. Yet, antitrust enforcement can be an
additional avenue of protection when the sale of the nonprofit
hospital or hospital system will result in substantially reduced
competition. In these situations, antitrust challenges can be
raised to preserve competition and to lessen the likelihood that
the purchaser will discontinue needed health care services to the
affected community.
B.

Federal Tax Considerations

Typically, Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") officials consider
the states to be in the best position to oversee problematic hospital conversions. 2 80 Nevertheless, the IRS is responsible for enforcing federal tax laws that apply to the status and operation of
tax-exempt organizations, including nonprofit hospitals and
foundations.28 '
The Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal income tax
entities that are "organized and operated exclusively" for religious, charitable, educational or scientific purposes, provided
that no part of the organization's net earnings inure to the bene277. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 30. The FTC has investigated only 10
proposed acquisitions by for-profit hospital and in three blocked the merger or required divestiture as a condition for allowing the transaction to proceed. See id. at 3031.
278. See id. at 5-6.
279. For an overview of the federal government's approach to antitrust activity in
the health care industry see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996).

280. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 28.
281.

See id.
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fit of any private shareholder or individual.282 The operation of
a hospital and the advancement of health both qualify as charitable activities.283 The organizational requirement merely entails that the institution properly organize itself as a nonprofit
organization under the relevant state nonprofit corporate law.
It is accomplished by including "magic language" in the entity's
articles of incorporation and by-laws restricting its activities to
purposes exempt under the Internal Revenue Code.284 The operational requirement prohibits a nonprofit organization from
engaging in private benefit or private inurement. 85 If a charitable organization allows its earnings to inure to the benefit of
private individuals, it forfeits its tax-exempt status.286
In a conversion transaction, private benefit can occur when
the sale of nonprofit assets benefits the purchaser more than incidentally.287 Typically, private benefit accrues to the purchaser
when nonprofit assets are sold for less than fair value. Undervaluing charitable assets does not serve the purpose of qualitatively furthering the hospital's tax-exempt purpose and results in
a quantitative benefit to the purchaser that is more than incidental to the public benefit achieved.288
282. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
283. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23,
1987); Singer, supra note 14, at 245; Bisesi, supra note 27, at 815 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959)); Fishman, supra note 2, at 704.
284. See Singer, supra note 14, at 245.
285. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii). Although the requirements for finding inurement or private benefit are similar, they differ in two respects.
First, inurement only applies to "insiders." Insider are individuals whose relationship
with the organization offers them the opportunity to make use of the organization's
income or assets for personal gain. Second, even a minimal amount of inurement
disqualifies an organization for tax-exempt status. Inurement arises where a financial
benefit represents a transfer of the organization's financial resource to an individual
solely by virtue of the individual's relationship with the organization, without regard
to accomplishing an exempt purpose. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980).
On the other hand, private benefit must be more than quantitatively or qualitatively
incidental to the activities of the exempt organization to jeopardize the entity's taxexempt status. To be incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large. That is, the activity can
only be accomplished by benefiting certain private individuals. To be incidental in a
quantitative sense, the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the
overall public benefit conferred by the activity. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan.
23, 1987) & 377,89 (Dec. 18, 1978). See also Rev. Rul. 69-545.
286. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987) & 377,89 (Dec. 18, 1978). See
also Rev. Rul. 69-545.
287. See Singer, supra note 14, at 245-46.
288. See id. at 246.
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Private inurement can occur when an officer, director or any
other individual in a position to control or influence the decisions of the nonprofit hospital receives a benefit, financial or
otherwise, from the hospital that is disproportionately greater
than the services he has rendered to the organization. 289 Typically, private inurement occurs when individuals with influence
over the nonprofit hospital's activities receive lucrative offers
for ownership interests in the purchasing entity, promises of future employment or consulting contracts in exchange for facilitating the conversion.
If a tax-exempt organization sells its assets for less than fair
value or allows insiders to benefit from the conversion, the taxexempt status of the nonprofit hospital is jeopardized because it
is no longer operating exclusively for its charitable purpose.2 9 °
Historically, since revocation of a hospital's tax-exempt status
would likely result in the hospital's closure or bankruptcy and
would not penalize the individuals who profited at the expense
of the public, the IRS has rarely imposed this sanction.29 '
In 1996, Congress enacted a law to provide closer scrutiny of
insider "excess benefit" deals.292 For the first time, the IRS was
authorized to impose an excise tax, 29 3 also known as an intermediate sanction, on individuals and organization managers who
receive economic benefits in excess of the consideration received by the nonprofit organization.294 In the conversion setting, individuals who fail to pay fair value for nonprofit hospital
assets or who receive a benefit beyond the value of the services
they rendered the nonprofit entity would be involved in an excess benefit transactions.295 Such individuals may be assessed a
289.
290.
291.
292.

See
See
See
See

id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
Bisesi, supra note 27, at 825.
Singer, supra note 14, at 247.
I.R.C. § 4958 (1998). See also Meri-Beth Robertson, IRS closely exam-

ines insider 'excess benefit' deals, 146 N.J.L.J. S-12 (1996).

293. The IRS is initially authorized to impose a 25% tax on the excess benefit
received. If the excess benefit is not corrected within the tax period, an additional tax
equal to 200% of the excess benefit may be imposed. Under certain circumstances,
organizational managers who participate in the excess benefit, but do not receive the
actual benefit, can be assessed a tax of 10% of the benefit bestowed, up to $10,000 for
each transaction. See I.R.C. § 4958 (a), (b); Singer, supra note 14, at 247-48.
294. See Singer, supra note 14, at 247.
295. An excess benefit transaction is a transaction in which the tax-exempt organization provides an economic benefit, directly or indirectly, to a disqualified person,
that exceeds the value of the consideration received by the organization. See Singer,
supra note 14, at 247; Ono, supra note 56, at 121.
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personal tax liability equal to twenty-five percent of the excess
benefit received.296
This enactment permits federal oversight of nonprofit hospital
conversions through the vigorous enforcement of intermediate
sanctions. If state conversion legislation requires detailed submissions as part of the approval process, the IRS is positioned to
evaluate and determine whether the purchase price results in an
excess benefit for the purchaser. The same detailed conversion
submissions would provide a basis to determine whether any
post-conversion commitments made to individuals with influence over the nonprofit hospital amount to private inurement.
The state attorney general could use federal tax-exempt rulings
to require modifications to the conversion agreement or to disapprove the transaction. Detailed post-transaction reporting requirements as to grant-making activities would deter private
benefit or private inurement by providing ample documentation
to facilitate periodic IRS audits.
At best, IRS enforcement of tax-exempt regulations can help
protect charitable assets but not community access to health
care. The IRS is authorized to evaluate the details of the conversion transaction for private benefit and private inurement issues and can insure that charitable assets are not diverted to
private hands.297 However, the IRS can neither require that the
community be informed of hospital conversion activity nor restrict the use of conversion proceeds to the provision of health
care in the affected community.298 As a result, federal tax considerations alone cannot adequately safeguard the community's
continued access to affordable health care.
296. See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1); Singer, supra note 14, at 248; Bisesi, supra note 27, at
812-13.
297. The IRS can pursue another avenue of oversight when the conversion activity results in a joint venture between the nonprofit hospital and for-profit entity. To
maintain tax-exempt status, the nonprofit's participation in the joint venture must
advance the nonprofit's charitable purpose and may not result in more than an incidental benefit to the for-profit partner. This usually will require that the nonprofit
exercise control over the day-to-day activities of the joint venture. Continued use of
the joint venture conversion form may decrease due to the for-profit entity's unwillingness to relinquish control of the venture. The nonprofit entity also has a additional
disincentive for choosing the joint venture conversion structure. Income earned by a
nonprofit organization from the joint venture may be subject to income tax under
unrelated business income tax rules. While these guidelines may make joint ventures
less attractive, they are not likely to curtail nonprofit hospital conversions, which most
often utilize the direct sale format. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978); GAO Report, supra note 10, at 29.
298. See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 17.
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In view of these limitations, and based in part on the GAO
report, Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark (D-Calif.), ranking
minority member of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee, introduced federal conversion legislation known as
HR 443, the "Medicare Non-Profit Protection Act of 1997.299
This legislation would require federal approval of nonprofit hospital conversions as a condition of continued participation in the
Medicare program. At present, the bill, which was referred to
the Health Subcommittee on January 21, 1997, has received no
further action.3 °°
Though an independent federal approval process for nonprofit conversions would likely create redundancies, it would
add substantial expertise, potentially streamlining the valuation
of charitable assets. In addition, comprehensive federal legislation would establish national standards for regulating nonprofit
hospital conversions.
Yet, to avoid impeding necessary conversions and to foster
continued health care reform, a better approach may be to allow
the individual states to coordinate conversion approval while simultaneously integrating federal expertise into the evaluation
process. An IRS review and approval of the transaction for private benefit and private inurement issues could assist states in
the determination that fair value is paid for charitable assets and
that conversion proceeds continue to be used for appropriate
charitable purposes. Federal legislation requiring the purchaser
to maintain minimum levels of health care services to the affected community as a condition of continued participation in
the Medicare program could greatly assist a state in assuring
that the affected community will continue to receive necessary
health care services. Even absent additional federal legislation,
the IRS is poised to supplement state nonprofit conversion legislation. What is necessary is the resolve to aggressively apply existing tax-exempt operational requirements to the conversion
approval process.
IV.

CONCLUSION: PROTECTION OF NONPROFIT CHARITABLE
ASSETS BY CURRENT CONVERSION STATUTES

Although the nonprofit community hospital historically has
been the backbone of the American health care delivery system,
299. Reps. Stark, Coyne Say GAO Report Supports Oversight of Hospital Transactions, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.
300. See id.
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health care reform requires that we focus on the quality and
quantity of the health care being delivered to our communities
rather than the form of the health care institution. Though conversion activity may not warrant encouragement, the cost-cutting pressures of managed care, reduced hospital inpatient stays
and reduced Medicare payments all necessitate that nonprofit
hospital conversions be accepted.
Notwithstanding this acceptance, the tenacious enforcement
of conversion legislation by state attorneys general is crucial to
the preservation of charitable assets. State conversion legislation must concentrate on the two major issues: (1) insuring that
fair value is received for charitable assets; and (2) establishing
an ongoing and effective system to regulate and monitor the
subsequent use of conversion proceeds.
Fair value is achieved by striking a balance between receiving
fair market value for nonprofit hospital assets and securing enforceable commitments from the purchaser to maintain a certain
level of health care services to the affected community, above
those mandated by existing state and federal law. To preserve
the community's investment in the nonprofit hospital, the subsequent use of conversion proceeds should be restricted to the
provision of necessary health care services-not necessarily inpatient care-in the affected community.
Collectively, conversion legislation has begun to fill the gap
between the states' inherent authority to protect charitable assets and its obligation to maintain access to and quality of health
care for its communities. Supplementing these initiatives with
aggressive enforcement of federal tax-exempt operational requirements will provide the needed mechanisms to preserve and
protect nonprofit hospital assets. While none of the current
conversion enactments successfully addresses all the issues that
arise when a nonprofit hospital pursues conversion, Rhode Island comes the closest. Rhode Island's statute dutifully endeavors to list all the potential issues that should be considered
during the approval process. Yet, even Rhode Island's legislation could be improved.
A synthesis of the best elements found in the various state
enactments and model codes would result in an optimal nonprofit hospital conversion statute. There is little doubt that the
more thorough the approval process, the greater the likelihood
the state will be successful in preserving charitable assets. Optimum conversion legislation would include the following:
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/3
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1. Reporting requirements: (1) when a transaction involves
the sale of twenty percent or more of a nonprofit's assets, or (2)
at any amount if the asset sale will change the nature of the
services historically provided by the nonprofit entity. Multiple
transactions occurring within a five-year period between related
parties would be evaluated collectively to determine if the aggregate purchases amount to a twenty percent change in ownership or control or change the nature of services historically
provided by the nonprofit entity.
2. Disclosure of the purchaser's commitments to continue
health care services in the affected community following the
conversion. Itemizing the purchaser's representations in the
transaction documents will enhance the attorney general's effectiveness in enforcing contractual obligations.
3. Court authorization. The purchaser should be required to
secure court authorization before eliminating or significantly reducing crucial health care services to the affected community.
Court approval will provide an effective system to monitor and
control the purchaser's post-conversion conduct.
4. Effective enforcement authority. In addition to the ability
to void the transaction and revoke hospital licenses, the attorney
general should have the authority to impose significant monetary penalties against the contracting entities and their officers
and directors for failure to secure the requisite approval. Fines
up to $10,000,000 against the contracting entities and $1,000,000
against the entities' officers and directors would provide a sufficient deterrent to unauthorized conversions.
In addition to empowering the attorney general with authority to require strict performance of contractual obligations by
the parties, conversion legislation should impose substantial civil
monetary penalties against individual corporate officers and directors for circumventing transaction obligations. For failure to
satisfy conversion commitments or for the misuse of conversion
proceeds, daily fines should be imposed. An alternative to establishing a specific daily fine, such as $10,000 per day, per occurrence, would be to establish fines in proportion to the value
of the commitments broken and charitable funds misappropriated. To be effective, legislation must include mechanisms to
detect whether community obligations are being met.
5. Annual reporting requirements. The purchaser should be
required to demonstrate compliance with all contractual obligations for a minimum of five years following conversion. Any
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entity receiving conversion proceeds should be required to disclose all grant-making activities and to demonstrate that those
expenditures are meeting the health care needs of the affected
community for a similar period. The attorney general should
retain the discretion to extend the reporting requirements until
all transactional commitments have been satisfied. Legislation
should provide for the automatic revocation of the purchaser's
operating license for the failure to file annual reports.
6. Qui tam provisions. Authorizing individuals and community groups to initiate suits on behalf of the attorney general in
the event that the purchaser fails to honor transaction commitments or the seller fails to restrict the use of conversion proceeds to the provision of health care services in the affected
community will inexpensively, but effectively, enhance attorney
general oversight of post-transaction activities.
7. Preserve foundation independence. Participation of the
parties and their affiliates on the boards of any charity receiving
conversion proceeds should be limited to twenty percent. The
remaining board members should be broadly representative of
the affected community. A representative of the attorney general should be an automatic appointment to newly created
boards for a minimum five-year period. A newly created foundation should also be required to file an annual report with the
attorney general, demonstrating that its activities and grants
have furthered the former nonprofit hospital's charitable
mission.
Current conversion legislative initiatives should be applauded
for their accomplishments. However, adequate safeguarding of
nonprofit hospital assets remains elusive. Attorney general initiative, rather than complacency, should ignite a renewed commitment to maximize the public's benefit in conversion proceeds
by restricting grant-making activities to the provision of health
care services in the affected community.
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